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Political activity is essential to unions’ mission of representing their 
members’ interests and ensuring that the voice of working and middle class 
employees is included in the political process so that public policies reflect their 
needs.1 This helps explain why the relentless decline in union density has not been 
matched by a decline in union political activity. To the contrary, union political 
activity, measured by political spending, has increased sharply in recent years and 
set new records in the 2012 election cycle.2 Nearly all of it went to Democrats.3 
This increase has been driven in part by a need to remain relevant amidst an 
 
1.  
From the first, there has been no line of demarcation between the bargaining, educational 
and political activities of unions. There is a tradition of over one hundred years of union 
political activity in this country. As the federal government has increasingly legislated in the 
field of union activity and on economic matters such as wages, hours and conditions of 
employment which are of the most immediate concern to laboring men as workers and as 
union members, the necessity for labor union political activity has correspondingly 
increased. Today the passage or defeat of any large number of bills affecting working men 
and their unions may be of as great importance to union members as the collective 
bargaining process itself. 
Joseph L. Rauh, Jr., Legality of Union Political Expenditures, 34 S. CAL. L. REV. 152, 163 (1961) (quoted 
in Marick F. Masters et al., Worker Pay Protection: Implications for Labor’s Political Spending and Voice, 48 
INDUS. REL. 557, 562 (2009)); see also Int’l Ass’n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 800 (1961) 
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (“[W]hat is loosely called political activity of American trade unions . . . 
[is] indissolubly relating to the immediate economic and social concerns that are the raison d’être of 
unions.”). 
2. It is important to note that the political strength of unions rests primarily on their ability to 
mobilize voters, and not on contributing money, since contributions from business dwarf those from 
unions. KENNETH G. DAU-SCHMIDT ET AL., LABOR LAW IN THE CONTEMPORARY WORKPLACE 
816 (2009). Nevertheless, union political expenditures are a significant form of union political activity 
and have increased substantially in recent years. In the 2012 cycle, labor spent $174.3 million on 
federal elections, a 95% increase from 2008 and a 229% increase from 1992, the first year that soft 
money contributions to political parties were publicly disclosed. Labor: Long-Term Contribution Trends, 
CENTER FOR RESPONSIVE POL., http://www.opensecrets.org/industries/totals.php?cycle=2012 
&ind=P (last visited May 28, 2014). 
3. In the 2012 cycle, Democrats received 91% of contributions made by unions. Business-
Labor-Ideology Split in PAC & Individual Donations to Candidates, Parties, Super PACs and Outside Spending 
Groups, CENTER FOR RESPONSIVE POL., https://www.opensecrets.org/bigpicture/blio.php?cycle 
=2012 (last visited Apr. 14, 2014). 
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escalating arms race in political spending by business, which outspent labor by a 
margin of more than fifteen-to-one4 and helped propel total spending to $6 
billion, shattering previous records.5 
Political activity is particularly important with regard to the ability of public 
sector unions to advocate for their members.6 This is because the employers are 
government officials, contracts must be approved by legislative bodies, and public 
sector labor laws severely restrict the forms of economic leverage public workers 
can use to advance their interests in contract negotiations.7 Nearly all of the 
money unions raise, whether for politics or general representational duties, comes 
from payroll deductions,8 which workers negotiate with their employers to have 
automatically deducted from their paychecks along with federal and state taxes, 
premiums for health and welfare plans, and voluntary donations to charities and 
other organizations. Unions rely so heavily upon payroll deductions because they 
are the most efficient method for unions to raise funds.9 By contrast, payroll 
deductions play a negligible role for business,10 which raises nearly all of its 
political funds11 and general revenues12 from the sale of goods or services. 
The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that spending money on political 
campaigns is political speech receiving the highest form of First Amendment 
protection13 and restrictions that limit the quantity of political expenditures are 
unconstitutional.14 But under a 2009 Supreme Court decision, unions’ political 
 
4. Id. 
5. 2012 Election Spending Will Reach $6 Billion, Center for Responsive Politics Predicts, CENTER FOR 
RESPONSIVE POL. (Oct. 31, 2012, 2:33 PM), http://www.opensecrets.org/news/2012/10/2012-
election-spending-will-reach-6.html. 
6. See generally Martin H. Malin, Does Public Employee Collective Bargaining Distort Democracy? A 
Perspective from the United States, 34 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 277 (2013) (summarizing research 
describing public sector collective bargaining as primarily a political process, and arguing that public 
sector collective bargaining furthers the democratic process and should be encouraged). 
7. See Public Sector Bargaining—State Laws, BLOOMBERG BNA (accessed Dec. 29, 2012) 
(listing restrictions on the right of public workers to strike). 
8. George Skelton, Prop. 32’s Real Purpose, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 18, 2012, at A2, available at 
http://articles.latimes.com/2012/oct/17/local/la-me-cap-prop32-20121018. 
9. Bailey v. Callaghan, 873 F. Supp. 2d 879, 881 (E.D. Mich. 2012), rev’d, 715 F.3d 956 (6th 
Cir. 2013). 
10. See id.; Alex Knott, PACs Collect Millions From Workers’ Paychecks, ROLL CALL (Oct. 25, 
2010), http://www.rollcall.com/issues/56_41/-50973-1.html. 
11. Nationwide, only about 800 companies use voluntary deductions to fund corporate PACs, 
as most contributions come from corporate executives. See Knott, supra note 10. 
12. The one exception is businesses that provide employee benefits, like health insurance 
companies, which is why such businesses are generally exempted from the scope of laws restricting 
the use of payroll deductions. See, e.g., Cal. Proposition 32 sec. 2 § 85151(c) (2012) (exempting 
deductions for employee benefit plans), available at http://vig.cdn.sos.ca.gov/2012/general/pdf/text 
-proposed-laws-v2.pdf#nameddest=prop32. 
13. See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 340 (2010); see also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 
14–15 (1976) (per curiam). The Court has distinguished between campaign contributions, which 
receive less protection, and campaign expenditures. See id. at 19–21, 23. 
14. See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 366 (affirming that permissible disclaimer and disclosure 
requirements cannot place a “ceiling” on campaign-related activities); Buckley, 424 U.S. at 39, 58–59 
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speech receives less constitutional protection than even hate speech.15 In Ysursa v. 
Pocatello Education Ass’n, the Court upheld an Idaho law limiting public sector 
unions’ use of payroll deductions to raise money for political activities.16 In so 
doing, the Court carved out a gaping hole in the First Amendment and gave fresh 
impetus to Republican legislators and conservative activists to pass similar laws 
throughout the country. As Republican leaders had already discovered, merely 
placing such measures on the ballot is an effective tactic to temporarily drain 
unions’ political resources and thus eliminate a key source of funding for 
Democrats. Actually passing such ballot measures threatens to do so on a 
permanent basis. 
The Court’s treatment of public sector union payroll deductions adds to a 
fundamental imbalance in the legal regime governing political speech. In Citizens 
United, the Court held that limitations on independent expenditures by 
corporations and unions violate the First Amendment and that government may 
not restrict political speech on the basis of the speaker’s identity.17 In this respect, 
the Court continued the symmetrical treatment of unions and corporations that 
had guided its regulation of political spending since the 1940s.18 
However, Professor Ben Sachs has demonstrated that the symmetrical 
regulation of how unions and corporations spend political money belies a 
significant disparity in how the law regulates the ability of unions and corporations 
to raise money.19 Work by Professor Sachs and other scholars focuses on the 
discrepancy between, on the one hand, federal law providing rights to dissenting 
employees to withhold their financial support for political and ideological activities 
by unions, and, on the other hand, federal law failing to extend equal protections 
to dissenting shareholders to withhold support for political activities by 
corporations.20 
 
(identifying and rejecting regulatory provisions that place restraints on the quantity of political 
speech). 
15. Compare Ysursa v. Pocatello Educ. Ass’n, 555 U.S. 353, 359 (2009) (applying rational basis 
review, and upholding a law requiring annual opt-in for public sector union payroll deductions for 
political purposes, even though the law drew a content-based distinction focusing only on political 
speech), and Wis. Educ. Ass’n Council v. Walker, 824 F. Supp. 2d 856, 874 (W.D. Wis. 2012) 
(applying Ysursa and upholding a law prohibiting payroll deductions for only certain unions), rev’d in 
part, 705 F.3d 640 (7th Cir. 2013), with R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 395–96 (1992) 
(indicating that content-based laws within categories of unprotected speech must meet strict scrutiny, 
and striking down a law criminalizing fighting words because it drew impermissible content-based 
distinctions between hate speech based upon race, religion, or gender, and hate speech based upon 
other characteristics). 
16. Ysursa, 555 U.S. at 355. 
17. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 350. 
18. The principle that corporations and unions should be treated similarly undergirds many 
earlier federal campaign finance laws. These include the War Labor Disputes Act (1943), the Federal 
Election Campaign Act (FECA) (1971), and the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA) (2002). See 
Benjamin I. Sachs, Unions, Corporations, and Political Opt-Out Rights After Citizens United, 112 COLUM. L. 
REV. 800, 801–03 (2012). 
19. Id. at 803. 
20. Id. (demonstrating that symmetrical treatment of unions and corporations in campaign 
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This Note focuses on another area in which federal law creates a major 
imbalance between the ability of unions and corporations to raise money for 
politics: the ability of states to limit union political fundraising, and thus political 
speech, through so-called paycheck protection laws.21 Such laws, derided by critics 
as “paycheck deception,” and which I refer to simply as payroll-restriction laws, 
encumber the way in which unions collect voluntary political contributions from 
the workers they represent.22 Payroll-restriction laws pose an even greater threat to 
union political speech than the enhanced rights for union dissenters to avoid 
paying for union political activities with which they disagree.23 This is because 
payroll-restriction laws generally limit speech not just by nonmembers opposed to 
the union’s political activities, but also by members who support them.24 
The Ysursa Court immunized such laws from heightened scrutiny under the 
First Amendment by extending the subsidized speech doctrine.25 Under this 
doctrine, when the government subsidizes speech—for example, by paying for a 
payroll system for its own employees—it is able to discriminate based upon the 
content of that speech even though this is ordinarily forbidden by the First 
 
finance law produces an asymmetrical campaign finance regime, due to asymmetrical rules regarding 
opt-out rights for dissenting union members and shareholders, and arguing that dissenting 
shareholders be given the same opt-out rights as dissenting union members); see also Catherine L. Fisk 
& Erwin Chemerinsky, Political Speech and Association Rights after Knox v. SEIU, Local 1000, 98 
CORNELL L. REV. 1023 ( July 2013) (discussing the asymmetry in the rights of dissenting union 
members and shareholders, and arguing that unions should be given the same broad speech rights to 
ignore dissenting members as corporations have been given with regard to dissenting shareholders). 
21. The term “paycheck protection” is a strongly partisan and value-laden term promoted by 
advocates of such laws who claim they will “protect” the paychecks of workers represented by unions 
from the supposed coercive payment of dues and voluntary political action committee (PAC) 
contributions. Opponents of such laws label them as “paycheck deception” because they view such 
measures as Trojan Horse legislation, whose purported focus on workers’ rights and campaign 
finance reform is a thinly veiled effort to obscure the true nature of laws cynically aimed at defunding 
unions and the Democratic candidates and liberal policies they support. See Masters et al., supra note 1, 
at 558 & n.1. This Note avoids both partisan labels and adopts the neutral term “payroll-restriction” 
laws, except when referring to the national “paycheck protection” movement because this is the term 
employed by those active in such efforts. 
22. Both sides of the debate use the “paycheck protection” and “paycheck deception” labels 
somewhat inconsistently to describe a wide array of legislation. This Note defines “payroll-restriction” 
legislation as laws that encumber the ability of public sector employees to use payroll deductions 
specifically to fund political activities. See id. at 558. 
23. See Knox v. Serv. Emps. Int’l Union, Local 1000, 132 S. Ct. 2277, 2295–96 (2012) 
(requiring unions to use an opt-in system for special assessments on nonmembers); Davenport v. 
Wash. Educ. Ass’n, 551 U.S. 177, 191 (2007) (upholding a state law requiring public employees 
represented by, but not members of, unions to opt-in to make political contributions through payroll 
deductions); Commc’ns Workers of Am. v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735, 780 (1988) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) 
(noting that the National Labor Relations Act prohibits private sector unions from charging 
nonmembers for political activities); Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 241 (1977) 
(declaring unconstitutional a state law requiring public employees represented by, but not members 
of, unions to pay for union political and ideological activities). 
24. See, e.g., WYO. STAT ANN. § 22-25-102(h) (West, Westlaw through 2014 Budget Sess.) 
(limiting the ability of all unions to obtain political contributions via payroll deductions, regardless of 
whether the employee is a member or nonmember). 
25. Ysursa v. Pocatello Educ. Ass’n, 555 U.S. 353, 359 (2009). 
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Amendment.26 Lower courts have followed Ysursa in upholding state laws passed 
by Republican-controlled legislatures imposing payroll restrictions on all unions27 
or even laws selectively targeting only those particular unions that were the 
Republicans’ political adversaries.28 Thus, the Seventh Circuit recently upheld a 
provision of a Wisconsin law that prohibited any government worker from 
contributing to a union through payroll deduction but exempted all workers whose 
unions had supported the electoral campaign of Republican Governor Scott 
Walker.29 
However, I argue Ysursa is not controlling of lower court challenges to 
payroll-restriction laws, and I propose three means by which courts can strike 
down many such laws, with each proposal focusing on a distinct branch of First 
Amendment analysis. First, in cases where states ban payroll deductions only for 
particular unions, courts can apply a First Amendment analysis because language 
in Ysursa limits its holding to laws enforced evenhandedly. Thus, the case does not 
control laws that are not applied evenhandedly or that demonstrate viewpoint 
discrimination.30 These situations would require the law to withstand heightened 
scrutiny, whereas courts applying Ysursa use only rational basis review. 
Second, I argue that payroll deductions to unions are not government 
subsidies for union or employee political speech. Courts may reach this conclusion 
in either of two ways. First, in most cases, payroll deductions for union political 
activities impose no costs on government beyond the costs the payroll system 
already create in allowing employees to use payroll deductions to pay taxes and 
make contributions to health insurance, pension plans, and charitable 
organizations. In Ysursa, there was no evidence concerning the cost to the 
government from allowing unions to use payroll deductions for political purposes, 
and the Court’s analysis rested on the assumption that this specifically defined 
subset of payroll deductions did in fact cost the government money.31 District 
courts can thus distinguish Ysursa by making findings of fact that the unions’ use 
of the preexisting government payroll systems for political purposes imposes no 
additional cost, and therefore the payroll systems are not government subsidies. 
Payroll systems are used for a wide range of deductions, and the incremental 
administrative cost of adding one more deduction is miniscule and likely not 
 
26. See id. at 358, 361; Utah Educ. Ass’n v. Shurtleff, 565 F.3d 1226, 1230 (10th Cir. 2009). 
27. See Utah Educ. Ass’n, 565 F.3d at 1228. 
28. See Wis. Educ. Ass’n Council v. Walker, 705 F.3d 640, 664–65 (7th Cir. 2013) (Hamilton, 
J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part). Although this case concerned a state law 
banning the use of payroll deductions for union dues, which includes but is not limited to funds used 
for political activities, the court analyzed the law under Ysursa and upheld it as constitutional. Id. at 
645–48 (majority opinion). I argue this case was wrongly decided because the law constituted 
viewpoint discrimination. See infra text accompanying notes 395–397. 
29. Several public safety unions that did not endorse Governor Walker were also exempted. 
See Wis. Educ. Ass’n Council, 705 F.3d at 667 (Hamilton, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting 
in part). 
30. See Ysursa, 555 U.S. at 361 n.3. 
31. Id. at 358–59, 363–64. 
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measurable. Alternatively, even where the facts show that union payroll 
deductions create some additional cost, lower courts may find a de minimis 
exception whereby very small government expenditures that private speakers are 
unable to decline are not government subsidies for the purpose of the government 
speech doctrine. Like the first proposal, the second proposal would allow courts 
to strike down payroll-restriction laws because it would take a case outside the 
ambit of Ysursa and its exception to the First Amendment, meaning heightened 
scrutiny would apply. Unlike the first proposal, the second proposal is applicable 
even to laws applied evenhandedly to all political speech. 
My third proposal addresses a third branch of First Amendment analysis, 
independent of the viewpoint discrimination and subsidized speech rules that are 
the focus of my first two proposals. Unions can argue that courts should not apply 
the subsidized speech doctrine to public employee payroll systems at all, but 
should instead analyze them as forums. Under the forum doctrine, which the 
Supreme Court did not address in Ysursa, the government’s ability to regulate 
speech on public property depends on how that property is categorized.32 
Specifically, the nature of many states’ regulations of public sector payroll systems 
may support an argument that a payroll system is a designated public forum, in 
which strict scrutiny applies. Like the second proposal, the third proposal is 
potentially applicable to any payroll law. 
Ultimately, the Court should overrule Ysursa. The case creates doctrinal 
incoherence by obscuring the relationship between the subsidized speech and 
public forum doctrines. It also creates doctrinal imbalance by producing a highly 
asymmetric campaign finance regime incompatible with Citizens United by allowing 
states to restrict the principal means by which unions raise political funds while 
leaving corporate political fundraising undisturbed. Finally, it produces undesirable 
effects by expanding the government subsidy doctrine to place substantial new 
categories of speech—those impacted by the myriad situations involving 
negligible, administrative government expenditures that private speakers are 
unable to avoid—outside the protections of the First Amendment. But until 
Ysursa is overturned, lower courts should remain cognizant of the limits of its 
holding and the tools still available to them to protect political speech. 
Part I.A of this Note places Ysursa in context by describing the mechanics of 
union payroll deductions, I.B describes the various legal measures that aim to 
restrict their use, and I.C discusses the major arguments made in support of these 
laws. Part I.D continues by applying insights gleaned from the field of behavioral 
economics to analyze the importance of payroll deductions as a method of 
fundraising and explain why efforts to encumber their use are so harmful to 
unions’ ability to raise political funds. Part I.E then concludes by tracing the 
evolution of the so-called “paycheck protection” movement, from its origin as a 
 
32. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 1165 (4th 
ed. 2011). 
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localized effort by conservative Christians to gain influence over public education 
to its maturation into a coordinated national effort by the Republican party to 
limit fundraising by Democrats. Part II describes the Ysursa case and summarizes 
the constitutional principles implicated by payroll-restriction laws in general and 
by Ysursa in particular. Part III explores the undesirable implications of Ysursa for 
First Amendment jurisprudence. Part IV proposes three means by which courts 
may nevertheless strike down many payroll-restriction laws, focusing on the First 
Amendment doctrines of viewpoint neutrality, subsidized speech, and public 
forums. 
I. PAYROLL DEDUCTIONS 
A. How Payroll Deductions Work 
Modern employers favor automated payroll systems because they are more 
efficient and less error prone than manual systems. Payroll deductions are a 
necessary component of payroll processing. Deductions may be made for a wide 
range of purposes,33 including taxes, employee benefit plans, charitable 
contributions, and union dues.34 Some deductions are mandatory. For example, 
federal law requires deduction of federal income and payroll taxes,35 and states and 
localities may require employers to make other deductions for items such as state 
income taxes and court-ordered garnishments.36 Other deductions are voluntary. 
State and local governments can regulate the type of payroll deductions they will 
allow.37 In addition, federal law allows unions and corporations to automatically 
deduct money from employees’ paychecks and use those funds for political 
purposes.38 
Unions collect nearly all of their funds using payroll deductions39 because 
this is the easiest and least expensive method available.40 Manual alternatives to 
payroll deductions, such as face-to-face solicitation, consume significant time and 
 
33. See, e.g., Aaron Sharockman, What Does It Cost Governments For Automatic Payroll Deductions?, 
POLITIFACT FLA. (Mar. 22, 2011), http://www.politifact.com/florida/statements/2011/mar/22 
/john-thrasher/what-does-it-cost-governments-automatic-payroll-de/ (citing DED LISTING, http:// 
spreadsheets.google.com/ccc?key=0Ag6LtLEJqtdcdHRKQkxlT2hfMGxWWkhHY3MzSVdGbVE&
hl=en&authkey=CM6RnI0P (last visited May 30, 2014) (listing 364 groups or agencies authorized in 
Florida to take money through automatic payroll deduction)). 
34. DED LISTING, supra note 33. 
35. I.R.C. §§ 3102 (FICA taxes), 3402(a) (income taxes) (2012). 
36. E.g., CAL. LAB. CODE § 224 (West 2011); see also Deductions From Wages, COLO. DEP’T. 
LAB. & EMP., https://www.colorado.gov/pacific/cdle/node/20146 (last visited May 31, 2014). 
37. E.g., LAB. § 224; see also City of Charlotte v. Local 660, Int’l Ass’n of Firefighters, 426 U.S. 
283, 287 n.3 (1976) (listing compulsory and optional payroll deductions for municipal firefighters). 
38. 11 C.F.R. § 114.5 (2014). 
39. Skelton, supra note 8. 
40. See Pocatello Educ. Ass’n. v. Heideman, No. CV-03-0256-E-BLW, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
34494, at *12–13 (D. Idaho Nov. 23, 2005), rev’d on other grounds, 561 F.3d 1048 (9th Cir. 2009) 
(reversing in accordance with Ysursa v. Pocatello Educ. Ass’n, 555 U.S. 353, 358 (2009)). 
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resources41 that unions could otherwise spend on representational activities. Even 
automated alternatives, such as bank drafts, are less effective because employees 
are less likely to use them.42 Unions therefore place a high priority on negotiating 
the right for the workers they represent to use their employer’s existing automatic 
payroll system to pay union dues and fees.43 
In the absence of payroll-restriction laws, unions and employers have the 
freedom to negotiate contracts allowing workers to make payments through 
automatic payroll deductions to the union representing them. Each worker must 
then provide written authorization allowing the automatic deductions to take 
place.44 Thus, at the outset, no deductions take place until unionized workers take 
at least two affirmative steps: first, collectively negotiating the right to use 
deductions, and second, individually authorizing them.45 
Workers’ payments to their unions include dues, which fund union collective 
bargaining activities as well as certain political activities.46 Federal law and many 
state laws prohibit unions from using dues to make direct contributions to 
candidates, political parties, and many types of political action committees 
(PACs),47 but dues may still be used to finance many other forms of political 
activity, such as independent expenditures and membership communications, 
 
41. Id. at *12–13. 
42. Id.; see also State ex rel. Evergreen Freedom Found. v. Wash. Educ. Ass’n, 999 P.2d 602, 
606 n.13 (Wash. 2000). 
43. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-361.02(E) (2012), invalidated by United Food & 
Commercial Workers Local 99 v. Brewer, 817 F. Supp. 2d 1118 (D. Ariz. 2011); FLA. STAT. § 447.303 
(West, Westlaw through 2014 Special “A” Sess.); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3599.031 (West, Westlaw 
through 2013–2014 General Assemb.); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 42.17A.495 (West 2012)). 
44. See § 23-361.02(E); § 447.303; § 3599.031; § 42.17A.495. 
45. Generally, workers who join a workforce that is not already unionized must take the 
additional affirmative step of organizing a union through a majority vote among the workers in their 
bargaining unit. The general practice among unions is that workers do not pay dues until after the 
union is recognized and a contract has been negotiated. See, e.g., Answers to Basic Questions, 
JOIN1199SEIU.ORG, http://www.join1199seiu.org/answers-to-basic-questions/ (last visited May 30, 
2014) (“When workers join 1199, they do not start paying dues until they have won a first contract 
. . . .”); FAQ, AM. AGENTS, http://american-agents.org/faq/ (last visited May 30, 2014) (“We will not 
pay dues until we have a contract.”); Northeastern Adjunct Faculty Are Forming a Union: Questions? Ask 
Us., ADJUNCT ACTION, http://media.wix.com/ugd/47f408_944e2c4bf52049b09136362875e2b0d9 
.pdf (last visited May 30, 2014) (“But no one pays dues until we have: 1) formed our union; 2) 
bargained our first contract; and 3) voted as a group to approve our contract.”); What Will My 
Employer Say?, OFF. & PROF. EMPS. INT’L UNION, http://www.opeiu.org/NeedAUnion 
/WhatWillMyEmployerSay.aspx (last visited May 30, 2014) (“No one pays any dues until after your 
union contract is negotiated, voted on and approved by you.”). 
46. Masters et al., supra note 1, at 557. 
47. 2 U.S.C. § 441b(a) (2012) (FECA); 11 C.F.R. § 114.5 (2014) (listing federal restrictions on 
political activity of unions and union separate segregated funds); see also State Limits on Contributions to 
Candidates: 2011–2012 Election Cycle, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (NCSL), http://www.ncsl.org 
/Portals/1/documents/legismgt/Limits_to_Candidates_2011-2012v2.pdf (last updated June 1, 2012) 
(listing limitations on union contributions to state candidates); Limits on Contributions to  
Political Parties, NCSL, http://www.ncsl.org/legislatures-elections/elections/limits-on-contributions 
-to-political-parties.aspx (last updated Feb. 5, 2008) (listing limitations on union contributions to state 
political parties). 
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which are each protected by the First Amendment.48 In fact, studies suggest the 
majority of union political activities are funded through dues.49 
Workers may also elect to make supplemental voluntary political 
contributions to their union’s PAC.50 Unlike dues, PAC contributions are not a 
requirement of membership, are spent only on political activities, and are 
subjected to fewer restrictions limiting how the money may be spent.51 PAC 
contributions may be made through a separate deduction, which workers must 
authorize independently of their authorization to pay dues.52 Alternatively, PAC 
contributions may be made through a “reverse dues check-off,” in which workers 
authorize a single deduction including both dues, which the union keeps, and 
supplemental political contributions, which the union remits to its PAC.53 After 
workers authorize any of these payments, the deductions continue automatically 
until the worker rescinds her authorization or leaves her job.54 
B. Laws Restricting the Use of Payroll Deductions 
Payroll-restriction laws limit the freedom of unions and employers to 
contract to allow employees to participate in these voluntary payroll deductions. 
Payroll-restriction legislation takes a variety of forms regarding the mechanism 
used to limit political fundraising, the scope of the political activities targeted, and 
the contributors and recipients covered.55 With regard to the mechanism, some 
legislation imposes new burdens on the use of payroll deductions that may 
discourage their use, such as new disclosure requirements for workers56 or 
 
48. See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 365 (2010) (holding limitation on independent 
expenditures by corporations and unions violate the First Amendment); United States v. CIO, 335 
U.S. 106, 121–22 (1948) (employing constitutional avoidance to interpret the Taft-Hartley Act as 
permitting a union to publish a periodical urging its members to vote for a political candidate). 
49. Between 2005 and 2011, unions’ spending on politics totaled $1.1 billion, according to 
reports filed with the Federal Election Commission (FEC). But these figures significantly understate 
unions’ total political activities, because FEC filings do not include spending on local and state 
campaigns, or internal communications with their own members. Spending on these activities totaled 
an additional $3.3 billion over this period, according to a Wall Street Journal analysis of disclosure 
reports filed with the United States Department of Labor. Although FEC data suffers from the same 
limitations with regard to corporate spending on politics, there is no comparable source for capturing 
corporations’ state and local political activities because only unions are subjected to such detailed 
disclosure requirements, which include line items for expenditures as specific as the amount spent on 
bratwursts purchased to feed workers protesting Wisconsin Governor Scott Walker’s drive to repeal 
union rights in 2010. Tom McGinty & Brody Mullins, Political Spending by Unions Far Exceeds Direct 
Donations, WALL ST. J., July 10, 2012, at A1. 
50. Masters et al., supra note 1, at 563–64. 
51. See id. 
52. See id. 
53. See State ex rel. Evergreen Freedom Found. v. Wash. Educ. Ass’n, 999 P.2d 602, 605 & 
n.12 (Wash. 2000) (describing “reverse dues check-off” system employed by the WEA prior to the 
passage of Initiative 134); Ky. Educators Pub. Affairs Council v. Ky. Registry of Election Fin., 677 
F.2d 1125, 1127–28 (6th Cir. 1982) (describing reverse check-off system). 
54. See State ex rel. Evergreen Freedom Found., 999 P.2d at 605 & n.12. 
55. See, e.g., Masters et al., supra note 1, at 572 tbl.6. 
56. E.g., Maryland H.D. 694, 2012 Leg., 430th Sess. (Md. 2012); S.B. 763, 2012 Leg., 430th 
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unions.57 Most legislation, however, erects more substantial barriers. Some 
legislation replaces a one-time opt-in with an annual opt-in requirement.58 More 
restrictive legislation categorically bans the use of payroll deduction to contribute 
funds for various political activities, even for workers who would otherwise 
choose to opt-in every year.59 The most onerous measures combine both 
mechanisms: they ban the use of payroll deductions and require annual 
reauthorization for any alternative form of automatic payment.60 Some laws do 
not impose direct limitations on the use of payroll deductions for political 
activities but instead prohibit any negotiations on the topic,61 thus allowing 
employers to unilaterally set terms or even prohibit their use outright. 
Payroll-restriction laws also vary considerably with regard to the political 
activities they target. Some legislation applies only to voluntary contributions to 
union PACs or separate segregated funds.62 As noted, PAC contributions are 
made in addition to union dues and are used only for political purposes. Other 
legislation takes the opposite approach and applies to political activities paid for 
with general treasury funds but exempts donations to PACs.63 More restrictive 
legislation applies to both PAC contributions and to certain political activities 
unions may finance using general dues revenue.64 And there are even proposals 
for model legislation targeting all union activities not germane to collective 
bargaining, including social, ideological, and charitable causes.65 Some legislation 
applies only to payments to be used for political activities,66 while other legislation 
 
Sess. (Md. 2012) (requiring disclosure of the names and addresses of each contributor to a campaign 
finance entity using payroll deduction). 
57. E.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-361.02(B) (2012) (requiring organizations using payroll 
deduction to fund their political activity to disclose to their members’ employers the maximum 
percent of the amount deducted that will be used for political activities), invalidated by United Food & 
Commercial Workers Local 99 v. Brewer, 817 F. Supp. 2d 1118, 1128 (D. Ariz. 2011). 
58. E.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 42.17A.495 (West 2012). 
59. E.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 44-2004(2) (West 2006). 
60. E.g., Cal. Sec’y of State, Proposition 32: Analysis by the Legislative Analyst, OFFICIAL VOTER 
INFO. GUIDE, http://voterguide.sos.ca.gov/past/2012/general/propositions/32/analysis.htm (last 
visited Feb. 6, 2014) [hereinafter Proposition 32: Analysis]. 
61. TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-5-608(b)(6) (West, Westlaw through 2014 2d Legis. Sess.) 
(prohibiting collaborative conferencing between the board of education and professional employees 
on payroll deduction for political activities). 
62. E.g., § 42.17A.495. 
63. E.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-361.02(E) (2012), invalidated by United Food & 
Commercial Workers Local 99 v. Brewer, 817 F. Supp. 23 1118 (D. Ariz. 2011). 
64. E.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 34-32-1.1 (West, Westlaw through 2014 General Sess.). 
65. ROBERT P. HUNTER, MACKINAC CTR. FOR PUB. POLICY, PAYCHECK PROTECTION IN 
MICHIGAN 10–12 (1998) (proposing restrictions on payroll deductions for all activities not germane 
to contract administration, collective bargaining, or grievance handling under Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty 
Ass’n, 500 U.S. 507, 507 (1991)). Many payroll deduction laws include myriad additional provisions to 
further limit the ability of unions to raise funds for political activities. For example, some laws limit 
the people from whom unions may solicit political contributions, the manner in which those 
contributions may be made, etc. This Note, however, focuses specifically on the use of payroll 
deductions. 
66. E.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 44-2004(2) (West 2006). 
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prohibits the use of payroll deductions to make any payments to an organization if 
any part of the payment is used for political activity.67 Legislation also varies with 
regard to how it defines “political activities,” and unions have challenged 
provisions of statutes they contend use definitions that are vague or overbroad 
under the First Amendment.68 
Another way in which legislation varies is with regard to the contributors and 
recipients it covers. Some legislation covers only contributions by public sector 
employees,69 while some covers contributions by both public and private sector 
employees.70 Most legislation applies equally to contributions by union members 
and nonmembers, although some legislation applies only to nonmembers.71 
Legislation also varies in terms of who may receive funds collected through 
payroll deduction. Some legislation applies only to contributions to unions,72 while 
other legislation applies to contributions to unions and corporations but exempts 
contributions to employee health and welfare plans and charities.73 There is also 
legislation that is facially neutral, proscribing all contributions by public employees 
to any recipient.74 
C. Arguments Made in Support of Payroll-Restriction Legislation 
Proponents of payroll-restriction laws make several arguments to justify their 
 
67. ALA. CODE § 17-17-5 (West, Westlaw through 2014 Legis. Sess.), enjoined by Ala. Educ. 
Ass’n v. Bentley, 788 F. Supp. 2d 1283 (N.D. Ala. 2011), rev’d sub nom. Ala. Educ. Ass’n v. State 
Superintendent of Educ., 746 F.3d 1135 (11th Cir. 2014). 
68. Bently, 788 F. Supp. 2d at 1324 (granting preliminary injunction on overbreadth and 
vagueness grounds), rev’d sub nom. Ala. Educ. Ass’n, 746 F.3d 1135 (reversing based upon the Alabama 
Supreme Court’s construction of the statute in response to two questions certified by the Eleventh 
Circuit); see also Defendants’ Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment at 2, 
Pocatello Educ. Ass’n v. Heideman, No. CV-03-0256-E-BLW, 2005 WL 3241745 (D. Idaho July 15, 
2005) (conceding that the Idaho Voluntary Contribution Act’s definition of “political activities” in 
Idaho Code § 44-2602(e) is unconstitutionally overbroad), rev’d on other grounds, 561 F.3d 1048 (9th Cir. 
2009) (reversing in accordance with Ysursa v. Pocatello Educ. Ass’n, 555 U.S. 353, 358 (2009)). 
69. E.g., § 34-32-1.1. 
70. E.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 42.17A.495 (West 2012); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 22-25-102 
(West, Westlaw through 2014 Budget Sess.). Laws restricting the ability of private sector workers to 
make political contributions using payroll deductions are likely preempted by the NLRA and 
unconstitutional under the First Amendment. See Lodge 76, Int’l Ass’n of Machinists & Aerospace 
Workers v. Wis. Emp’t Relations Comm’n, 427 U.S. 132, 154 (1976) (holding state law regulating 
conduct that federal law intended to leave unregulated is preempted by the NLRA). 
71. See State ex rel. Evergreen Freedom Found. v. Wash. Educ. Ass’n, 999 P.2d 602, 637 & 
n.92, 638–40 (Wash. 2000) (holding that RCW 42.17.760, enacted by Washington’s I-134, required 
unions to obtain individual authorization to use nonmembers’ agency fees for political purposes, but 
did not similarly require unions to obtain individual authorization to use members’ dues for political 
purposes). 
72. E.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 44-2004(2) (West 2006); Ysursa v. Pocatello Educ. Ass’n, 555 
U.S. 353, 371 (2009) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that section 44-2004(2) was intended to 
specifically target union fundraising). 
73. E.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-361.02(E) (2012), invalidated by United Food & 
Commercial Workers Local 99 v. Brewer, 817 F. Supp. 2d 1118 (D. Ariz. 2011); Cal. Proposition 32 
sec. 2 § 85150(c) (2012). 
74. E.g., § 34-32-1.1. 
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efforts as desirable social policy and not an effort to silence specific political 
voices.75 However, none of these arguments withstand scrutiny, suggesting they 
are mere pretext for efforts to defund unions’ political activities. 
First, proponents argue that these laws will save taxpayers money because 
they will free government from paying the cost of administering payroll 
deductions for union political contributions.76 However, common sense and 
evidence from various states suggest the cost is miniscule and likely too small to 
measure. For example, in 2011 the Florida legislature considered legislation to 
eliminate payroll deductions for public employee unions and conducted three 
analyses of the bill’s fiscal impact.77 One analysis found the impact might be 
“positive, but insignificant,” another found it would be “neutral,” and a third 
found it “indeterminate.”78 Also in 2011, a Michigan legislative analysis of H.B. 
4929, a bill to prohibit public school employees from using payroll deductions to 
pay union dues, concluded the measure “would have no significant fiscal impact 
on school districts” because the process “is largely automated.”79 In addition, 
many states have statutes that allow them to negotiate with unions over paying the 
administrative costs80 or simply require the unions to pay these costs.81 In fact, 
independent analyses in some states have concluded that implementing payroll 
restrictions will actually add to the government’s administrative costs by requiring 
government to implement and enforce the new requirements.82 
Second, and closely related, proponents argue that these laws will avoid the 
appearance of government favoritism or entanglement in partisan politics.83 
 
75. See generally GORDON LAFER, ECON. POLICY INST., THE “PAYCHECK PROTECTION” 
RACKET (2013) (summarizing arguments). 
76. Id. at 10 (citing the Michigan Chamber of Commerce); see also Sharockman, supra note 33. 
77. Sharockman, supra note 33. 
78. Id. 
79. H.R. 2011-4929, 1st Sess. (Mich. 2011) (legislative analysis as reported from committee), 
available at http://www.legislature.mi.gov/documents/2011-2012/billanalysis/house/pdf/2011-HLA 
-4929-3.PDF. 
80. E.g., FLA. STAT. § 447.303 (West, Westlaw through 2014 Special “A” Sess.). 
81. E.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3599.031 (West, Westlaw through 2013–2014 General 
Assemb.). 
82. E.g., Cal. Sec’y of State, supra note 60 (last visited Feb. 6, 2014) (concluding the measure 
would create increased costs to state and local government possibly exceeding $1 million annually); 
Letter from Elizabeth G. Hill, Legislative Analyst, Legislative Analyst’s Office, to Bill Lockyer, Att’y 
Gen., Cal. Dep’t of Justice (Feb 11, 2005), http://www.lao.ca.gov/ballot/2005/050027.pdf; Cal. Sec’y 
of State, Proposition 226: Analysis by the Legislative Analyst, OFFICIAL VOTER INFO. GUIDE, 
http://primary98.sos.ca.gov/VoterGuide/Propositions/226analysis.htm (last visited Feb. 6, 2014) 
(concluding the measure would generate annual administrative costs of $2 million); 2011 Initiative 
Analysis: Stop Special Interest Money Now Act, LEGIS. ANALYST’S OFF. (May 6, 2011), 
http://www.lao.ca.gov/ballot/2011/110309.aspx; see also Elizabeth G. Hill, California’s Legislative 
Analyst’s Office: An Isle of Independence, SPECTRUM: J. ST. GOV’T, Fall 2003, at 26, available at 
http://www.lao.ca.gov/IsleOfIndependence (describing the Legislative Analyst’s independence). 
83. LAFER, supra note 75, at 13 (citing American Legislative Exchange Council). This reason 
was also the rational basis the Supreme Court used to uphold an Idaho law banning the use of payroll 
deductions by state and local government employees to make political contributions to their unions. 
See Ysursa v. Pocatello Educ. Ass’n, 555 U.S. 353, 355 (2009). 
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However, it is unclear how the entanglement argument survives the observation 
that the payroll deductions do not actually involve any measurable expenditure of 
government resources. Nor does the government favoritism argument withstand 
scrutiny in light of the overwhelmingly lopsided impact that payroll-restriction 
laws exert on one voice (unions, but not corporations) and on one political party 
(Democrats, which receive nearly all union political contributions identifiable with 
a political party), and the broad exemptions many payroll-restriction laws provide 
for contributions that finance political activities by organizations other than 
unions.84 Thus, when judged by their effect, payroll-restriction laws appear to 
deeply entangle the government in a highly partisan political struggle. 
Third, proponents argue that payroll-restriction laws provide workers greater 
control over how their wages are spent. This is necessary, the argument continues, 
because many workers do not share their unions’ political priorities and contribute 
only due to coercion. Proponents of this argument cite the decline in political 
contributions following the implementation of such laws as evidence supporting 
this proposition.85 It is true that evidence does indicate political donations decline 
following the enactment of such laws.86 For example, one report by a conservative 
think tank concluded that payroll-restriction laws are associated with reductions in 
public sector union political expenditures of more than fifty percent.87 Other 
anecdotes point to dramatic declines in the percentage of union members making 
political contributions following the implementation of such laws.88 After Idaho 
passed legislation requiring public employee PACs to obtain annual written 
consent from workers wishing to make contributions using payroll deduction, the 
percentage of unionized workers contributing fell by seventy-eight percent.89 And 
for one Utah employee association, the percentage of workers contributing to its 
PAC fell even more precipitously, from 68% to just 6.8% in one year.90 
 
84. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-361.02(E) (2012), invalidated by United Food & 
Commercial Workers Local 99 v. Brewer, 817 F. Supp. 2d 1118 (D. Ariz. 2011); Cal. Proposition 32 
sec 2. § 85150(c) (2012); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 42.17A.495 (West 2012). 
85. See HUNTER, supra note 65, at 7; JAMES SHERK, THE HERITAGE FOUND., WHAT DO 
UNION MEMBERS WANT? WHAT PAYCHECK PROTECTION LAWS SHOW ABOUT HOW WELL 
UNIONS REFLECT THEIR MEMBERS’ PRIORITIES 4 (2006), available at http://www.heritage.org 
/research/reports/2006/08/what-do-union-members-want-what-paycheck-protection-laws-show-
about-how-well-unions-reflect-their-members-priorities. 
86. Infra note 87. 
87. SHERK, supra note 85, at 7. The study measures union contributions to candidates for state 
office but does not include soft money expenditures, nor does it measure actual union fundraising. Id. 
at 5, 10. The study includes a regression analysis the study’s author concludes demonstrates a causal 
relationship. Id. at 9. 
88. Infra note 89. 
89. After Washington voters passed I–134, the number of contributors to the union’s PAC 
fell from a high of 44,785 to a low of 9756 as of September 1995. Total contributions fell by 
$455,364. State ex rel. Evergreen Freedom Found. v. Wash. Educ. Ass’n, 999 P.2d 602, 606 n.13 
(Wash. 2000). 
90. Figures are for the Utah Education Association. Larry Sand, Prop 32 Protects Paychecks, Ends 
Payroll Deductions for Political Contributions, CAL. POL. REV. (Oct. 4, 2012), available at 
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There are two major problems with this argument. First, workers already 
maintain control over their unions’ political activities by electing (or voting out) 
their union’s leadership, and through the option to vote to disband their union 
entirely.91 Second, the coercion metaphor does not fit. This argument appropriates 
the language of what I will call the “dissenters’ rights” movement against 
compelled union speech. This refers to efforts to facilitate and encourage 
nonmembers to withhold payment for their union’s political activities with which 
they disagree (through opt-out procedures permitted by Davenport and required by 
Abood and Knox), and to eliminate the requirement for nonmembers to make any 
compulsory payments to their unions through so-called “right to work” laws.92 
However, payroll restrictions are distinguishable from all efforts to enhance the 
rights of dissenters to withhold payments because they apply to the activities of 
union members who have already taken the affirmative step to voluntarily associate 
themselves with the union and who continue to maintain that relationship. 
D. Why Do Restrictions on Payroll Deductions Matter? Insights from Behavioral Economics 
Empirical evidence demonstrating a relationship between payroll-restriction 
laws and declines in workers’ financial support for their union’s political 
activities93 nevertheless raises two questions. First, if this is not evidence that 
workers do not agree with their union’s political activities, how else can it be 
explained? And second, if workers do in fact support their union’s political 
activities, why do these laws even matter? After all, payroll-restriction laws do not 
actually prohibit workers from making political contributions to either their union 
or their union’s PAC; they merely restrict or eliminate one method of doing so. 
Union workers are still free to contribute money through other means—for 
example, by sending a monthly or annual check or even setting up alternative 
means of automated recurring contributions such as bank drafts. 
Insights gleaned from research in the field of behavioral economics suggest 
answers to both questions. First, research suggests that declining participation 
rates in union political contributions after payroll-restriction laws are enacted 
actually tell us very little about workers’ underlying motivations and the depth of 




91. LAFER, supra note 75, at 6. 
92. See Knox v. Serv. Emps. Int’l Union, Local 1000, 132 S. Ct. 2277, 2295–96 (2012); 
Davenport v. Wash. Educ. Ass’n, 551 U.S. 177, 191 (2007); Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 
209, 241 (1977). In fact, every state with active payroll-restriction laws is a so-called “right to work” 
state, in which workers represented by unions may withhold all payments to the union that represents 
them even though the union is still required to provide representational services equivalent to those 
provided to its paying members. See Right to Work States, NAT’L RIGHT TO WORK LEGAL DEF. 
FOUND., INC., http://www.nrtw.org/rtws.htm (last visited May 13, 2013) (listing so-called “right to 
work” states). 
93. Supra notes 87, 89–90. 
94. Infra Part I.D.1. 
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demonstrates that payroll-restriction laws change behavior simply by altering the 
default setting or by eliminating the ability to use payroll deductions altogether.95 
Numerous studies demonstrate that across a wide range of voluntary activities, 
most people do not change the default option when choosing whether to 
participate in a given activity, and the use of payroll deductions has a significant 
and positive effect on contribution rates and levels.96 A wide range of studies 
provides both a theoretical and empirical foundation for these arguments. 
Behavioral economists focus on descriptive theories of how people actually 
behave, taking into account psychological and cognitive factors, rather than on 
normative theories of how people should behave, based on the premise that people 
are unfailingly rational actors who make decisions only in their own economic 
self-interest.97 This research rests on a simple and straightforward premise: even 
minor adjustments in placing or removing obstacles to action can produce 
enormous changes in human behavior.98 This premise thus cautions against 
inferring a direct relationship between behavioral outcomes and the motivations 
and values supposedly underlying them. 
Although little research exists specifically focusing on payroll-restriction 
laws, there is considerable research on the impact produced in other settings by 
the two primary mechanisms payroll-restriction laws utilize: default settings and 
the availability of payroll deductions. 
1. Default Settings 
Scholars have identified several behavioral phenomena that help explain why 
individuals disproportionately stick with the default setting or status quo. One 
phenomena is “procrastination,” defined as the tendency to irrationally defer 
actions one realizes to be in her own best interest due to a breakdown in self-
control.99 A common example experienced by many people is the recurring failure 
to cancel an automatically renewing subscription to a magazine we no longer read 
or want; we defer cancelling it now, although we plan to do so later. A second and 
 
95. Infra Part I.D. 
96. Infra notes 102–114, 107–110, 112, 121–127. 
97. See BILL MORGAN ET AL., CHARTERED INST. OF PAYROLL PROFESSIONALS, PAYROLL 
DEDUCTION AND PROPENSITY TO SAVE: A LITERATURE REVIEW 5 (2008). See generally RICHARD 
H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE (2008); Melissa A.Z. Knoll, The Role of Behavioral Economics 
and Behavioral Decision Making in Americans’ Retirement Savings Decisions, 70 SOC. SECURITY BULL. 1 
(2010) (both works summarizing research in behavioral economics and arguing policymakers should 
utilize insights derived from this research to craft interventions that influence behavior in socially 
desirable ways). 
98. THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 97, at 3. 
99. James Surowiecki, Later: What Does Procrastination Tell Us About Ourselves?, NEW YORKER 
(Oct. 11, 2010), available at http://www.newyorker.com/arts/critics/books/2010/10/11/101011crbo 
_books_surowiecki. This definition is utilized by behavioral economists and contrasts with the way 
traditional economists use the term to refer to rational choices made in response to transaction costs 
for the purpose of timing decisions to optimize costs and benefits. Brigitte C. Madrian & Dennis F. 
Shea, The Power of Suggestion: Inertia in 401(k) Participation and Savings Behavior, 116 Q. J. ECON. 1149, 
1150, 1177–80 (2001). 
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closely related phenomenon is the “status quo bias,” which is the tendency to 
choose inaction over action when both are options.100 A third phenomenon is the 
perception by many people that the default option is a tacit endorsement of that 
option by the sponsoring entity.101 
Numerous studies have documented effects of equivalent magnitude to 
those observed in the union political contributions context from the transition 
between opt-out and opt-in regimes in areas as diverse as organ donation and 
retirement savings.102 A study of organ donor consent rates among eleven 
European countries revealed striking differences between countries with opt-in or 
“explicit-consent” policies, where people are not organ donors unless they register 
to be, and countries with opt-out or “presumed-consent” policies, where people 
are donors unless they register not to be.103 Consent rates in the explicit-consent 
countries ranged from 4.25% in Denmark to 27.5% in the Netherlands, while 
consent rates in presumed-consent countries ranged from 85.9% in Sweden to 
99.97% in France and were at least 98% in every other country studied.104 
The powerful effects defaults exert on behavior, moreover, appear to move 
in only one direction. Specifically, while it does not appear that opt-outs lead 
people to make choices they would not otherwise make, opt-ins lead many people 
to forego choices they would otherwise make. One study on organ donation rates 
used a laboratory test to compare the impact of an opt-in default setting, an opt-
out default setting, and a third option which included no default but required 
participants to choose whether to become donors.105 Only forty-two percent of 
participants agreed to be organ donors if required to opt-in, compared to eighty-
two percent of participants required to opt-out and seventy-nine percent of 
participants presented with no default setting.106 Thus, participation increased only 
slightly when moving from no default setting to an opt-out setting, while 
participation was cut nearly in half when moving from no default setting to an 
opt-in setting. 
Research on the impact of default settings on participation rates in 
retirement savings plans provides a second example. Thus, one study found the 
percentage of workers participating in a defined-contribution plan after three 
 
100. See Knoll, supra note 97, at 19; William Samuelson & Richard Zeckhauser, Status Quo Bias 
in Decision Making, 1 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 7, 8 (1998). 
101. See Madrian & Shea, supra note 99, at 1149, 1150, 1176–86. 
102. A third example is the purchase of auto insurance. See Eric J. Johnson & Daniel 
Goldstein, Do Defaults Save Lives?, 302 SCIENCE 1338, 1338 (2003) (reporting that seventy-five percent 
of consumers purchased automobile insurance with an unrestricted right to sue in Pennsylvania, 
where this was the default choice, compared to just twenty percent of consumers in New Jersey, 
where the default choice was a restricted right to sue). 
103. Id. at 1338–39. 
104. Id. at 1338. 
105. Id. 
106. Id. 
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months of employment increased from twenty percent under an opt-in system to 
ninety percent after the employer adopted an opt-out system.107 
Even more striking is that the influence of these behavioral explanations 
persists even when the default option is objectively a poor choice.108 For example, 
a review in the United Kingdom of twenty-five defined-benefit retirement plans, 
which are fully employer-paid and require no employee contribution, revealed that 
nearly half (forty-nine percent) failed to sign up, the equivalent of throwing away 
compensation by not bothering to cash a paycheck.109 Another study found that 
many employees participating in a defined-contribution plan remain in the default 
savings rate and investment option, which results in a savings rate of just three 
percent and a highly conservative investment choice of a money market 
account.110 Many specialists agree that these are poor choices because they will 
result in insufficient savings and a destitute retirement.111 Similarly, the tendency 
to remain with the status quo may explain why many people near retirement age 
suffered heavy losses when the stock market declined sharply in 2008: they had a 
very large percentage of their retirement assets in equities, despite the advice of 
financial experts to redistribute retirement investments toward less-risky assets as 
retirement age nears.112 
All of these studies demonstrate the tendency for people to remain with the 
default option, across a wide range of activities and even in cases where the default 
option is objectively a poor choice. It should thus come as no surprise that the 
percentage of union workers contributing to their union’s political activities 
declines following the implementation of laws imposing annual authorization 
requirements to make contributions via payroll deductions,113 because such laws 
change the default option to “no contribution” by requiring workers to opt-in—
not once, but every year. 
 
107. THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 97, at 109 (citing Madrian & Shea, supra note 99, at 
1149–225). The difference in participation rates after thirty-six months of employment was less 
dramatic but still significant: sixty-five percent under the opt-in system compared to ninety-eight 
percent under the opt-out system. 
108. Although increasing the rate of organ donation will produce desirable social effects by 
increasing the number of lives that may be saved, some individuals may decide against donating their 
own organs for a variety of reasons, and this Note takes no position on the merit of those decisions. 
However, traditional economic theory teaches that choices providing people with more money are 
objectively rational and examples of choices impacting retirement savings are therefore used to 
illustrate the premise that default bias persists even when the default is objectively a bad choice. 
109. See THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 97, at 108. 
110. Madrian & Shea, supra note 99, at 1153. 
111. THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 97, at 110, 129; Knoll, supra note 97, at 3–4. 
112. Knoll, supra note 97, at 3. This phenomenon was identified in an earlier study that found 
nearly three-quarters (seventy-two percent) of Harvard University employees, who were participants 
in the TIAA-CREF pension plan, never changed the way their contributions were being allocated 
between funds, despite large differences in rates of return. Samuelson & Zeckhauser, supra note 100, 
at 31–33. 
113. Supra notes 89–90. 
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2. Payroll Deductions 
Laws that eliminate altogether the availability of payroll deductions for union 
political contributions impair fundraising for additional reasons. Researchers have 
identified behavioral phenomena that interfere specifically with efforts to put aside 
money for the purpose of long-term goals. These include loss aversion, reference 
dependence, and hyperbolic discounting. “Loss aversion” refers to the 
phenomenon that people do not experience losses and gains equally, and studies 
show that people dislike losses about twice as much as they like equivalent 
gains.114 “Reference dependence,” also called “anchoring around the default,” is 
the tendency to evaluate wealth relative to a status quo reference point rather than 
in absolute terms.115 Thus, where the reference point is set will determine whether 
a change is perceived as a loss, and consequently whether it triggers the powerful 
negative reaction predicted by loss aversion. 
“Hyperbolic discounting” refers to the phenomenon whereby peoples’ 
preference for smaller, short-term gains over larger, long-term gains increases as a 
decision nears.116 For example, suppose that a person is given the option of 
waiting twenty-five days to receive ten dollars or waiting thirty days to receive 
twenty dollars. Experiments show that although this person may choose the 
second option while the rewards are twenty-five and thirty days away, she will 
likely reverse her preference and select the first option when the delays are 
reduced to one day and six days, even though both scenarios involve differences 
of ten dollars and five days. 
Imagine how these concepts might apply to a hypothetical worker who 
desires to save money to fund a long-term goal such as a secure retirement.117 She 
realizes that achieving her goal requires foregoing an immediate benefit by giving 
up some money now in exchange for the long-term benefit of a more comfortable 
retirement. However, due to reference dependence, she experiences each 
contribution to her retirement account as a loss because her income has been 
reduced below the reference point of her precontribution take home pay. Even 
though the current loss is offset by the future gain of a more comfortable 
retirement, loss aversion amplifies her sensation of loss and makes this appear to 
be an unequal exchange. And, due to hyperbolic discounting, her preference for 
 
114. Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Loss Aversion in Riskless Choice: A Reference-Dependent 
Model, 106 Q. J. ECON. 1039 (1991). 
115. Knoll, supra note 97, at 11; Madrian & Shea, supra note 99, at 1150. 
116. This phenomenon is attributed to the insight that people discount future benefits at a 
hyperbolic rather than at an exponential rate. See Kris N. Kirby & R.J. Herrnstein, Preference Reversals 
Due to Myopic Discounting of Delayed Reward, 6 PSYCHOL. SCI. 83, 83 (1995). Construal level theory 
(CLT) provides a cognitive theory for this behavior. CLT posits that people perceive events that are 
in the near future more in terms of the means required to achieve them, and perceive events in the 
distant future more in terms of the goals they represent. See Yaacov Trope & Nira Liberman, Temporal 
Construal, 110 PSYCHOL. REV. 403, 409 (2003). 
117. Unfortunately, this situation is hardly hypothetical. A 2001 study found that eighty-two 
percent of respondents desired to save money, but sixty percent felt they were not saving enough for 
the future. Knoll, supra note 97, at 2. 
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the long-term benefit over the short-term benefit will likely reverse as the moment 
of making her contribution approaches, and she may ultimately decide she prefers 
to spend the money today. It is certainly possible to overcome each of these 
factors; recall that our hypothetical worker wants to save for retirement. But doing 
so requires self-control that studies suggest many people do not have. 
Scholars have identified payroll deductions as an effective tool for 
neutralizing each of these factors by reducing the need for self-control.118 First, 
payroll deductions help mitigate loss aversion by changing the reference point. A 
worker’s reference point for income is typically not her gross earnings but rather 
her take-home pay after deductions for taxes, employee benefits, and other items 
are made.119 Because the reference point already incorporates the payroll 
deduction, the deduction—unlike contributions made from take-home pay—will 
not be perceived as a loss. Second, payroll deductions also function as a 
“precommitment device,” a term used to refer to voluntary arrangements to 
restrict one’s future options in order to overcome the tendency to forsake long-
term goals for instant gratification.120 This helps the worker bypass the effects of 
hyperbolic discounting by locking in a decision to choose long-term benefits over 
short-term benefits at a time when such a tradeoff looks like a good decision 
because it is not imminent. Thus, scholars recognize the efficacy of payroll 
deductions in facilitating many voluntary activities including savings by low-
income households,121 workplace charitable giving,122 retirement savings,123 and 
 
118. Infra notes 119–120. 
119. Knoll, supra note 97, at 11. 
120. Id. at 9–10. 
121. Sondra G. Beverly & Michael Sherraden, Institutional Determinants of Saving: Implications for 
Low-Income Households and Public Policy, 28 J. SOCIO-ECON. 457, 465 & n.20 (1999) (identifying payroll 
deduction as a primary method of “facilitation” which promotes higher savings rates through 
precommitment constraints that make it difficult to choose current pleasure at the expense of future 
pleasure, and citing a study of community development credit union members in which forty-eight 
percent of survey respondents said that direct payroll deposit into savings would make it easier for 
them to save); see also Michael Sherraden et al., Income, Institutions, and Saving Performance in Individual 
Development Accounts, 17 ECON. DEV. Q. 95, 97–98 (2003) (discussing, inter alia, the common practice 
of using the income tax withholding system as a kind of automatic saving plan); id. at 107 (noting that 
ninety percent of participants in a low-income saving program favored rules that limited their ability 
to withdraw funds for unapproved purposes). 
122. AMERICA’S CHARITIES, EMPLOYEE WORKPLACE CAMPAIGNS AT THE CROSSROADS: 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR REVITALIZATION 9 (2000) (describing payroll deductions as “the highest 
yielding and the lowest cost method of fund raising for nonprofit[s]”); Karen Wright, Generosity vs. 
Altruism: Philanthropy and Charity in the United States and United Kingdom, 12 INT’L J. VOLUNTARY & 
NONPROFIT ORGS. 399, 414 (2001) (observing that “[p]robably the most powerful and efficient 
institutional mechanism for generating significant giving across income levels in the United States is 
payroll giving”). 
123. Knoll, supra note 97, at 9–11 (describing the ways in which payroll deductions overcome 
cognitive biases against retirement saving). See generally BILL MORGAN ET AL., PAYROLL DEDUCTION 
AND PROPENSITY TO SAVE (2008) (summarizing research into behavioral biases that inhibit 
retirement saving, and recommending the use of payroll deductions as a central plank in an effort to 
encourage greater savings). 
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college savings plans,124 and for this reason frequently recommend their use to 
increase contributions.125 
Numerous studies provide empirical evidence supporting these theories. One 
study of workplace charitable-giving campaigns found that the use of payroll 
deductions increases the likelihood that employees will contribute, and that 
contributions made through payroll deductions are four to six times greater than 
gifts made through other means.126 Another study found a positive relationship 
between the use of automated deposits, including payroll deductions, and more 
regular and larger deposits and larger total savings in a college savings plan.127 
Insights provided by research on the behavioral obstacles to long-term 
saving, and the role of payroll deductions in overcoming them, are directly 
applicable to political contributions by union workers. Like saving for retirement 
and other long-term goals requiring voluntary contributions, political 
contributions require a trade-off between less money today in exchange for a 
future benefit, in this case an amplified voice in the political process with the goal 
of securing material benefits such as greater wages, benefits, and job security. In 
fact, because the relationship between the quantity of political expenditures and 
the favorability of political outcomes is—thankfully, for the sake of our political 
system—more attenuated than the relationship between the amount of retirement 
savings and the eventual size of one’s retirement nest egg, factors such as loss 
aversion and hyperbolic discounting are even more powerful deterrents to 
participation, and the benefit of payroll deductions are therefore even more 
pronounced. 
E. The Right’s Attack on Unions’ Use of Payroll Deductions 
Given the effectiveness of payroll-restriction laws as a tool to limit union 
political fundraising, it may be unsurprising that unions’ political opponents have 
seized so aggressively on this tactic. However, the origin of efforts to pass these 
laws is more complicated. Paycheck restriction laws were initially developed as a 
weapon in the culture wars between the Religious Right and the teachers’ unions 
in their fight for control over public education.128 Efforts to pass these laws 
 
124. MARGARET CLANCY ET AL., WASH. UNIV. IN ST. LOUIS, INCLUSION IN COLLEGE 
SAVINGS PLANS: PARTICIPATION AND SAVING IN MAINE’S MATCHING GRANT PROGRAM 18,  
25–26, 42 (2006), available at http://csd.wustl.edu/Publications/Documents/RP06-03.pdf. 
125. Supra notes 121, 123–124. 
126. AMERICA’S CHARITIES, supra note 122, at 9. 
127. CLANCY ET AL., supra note 124, at 25–27. 
128. Elizabeth Shogren & Douglas Frantz, School Boards Become the Religious Right’s New Pulpit, 
L.A. TIMES, Dec. 10, 1993, at A1, available at http://articles latimes.com/1993-12-10/news/mn 
-255_1_school-board [hereinafter Shogren & Frantz, Religious Right’s New Pulpit] (describing the efforts 
of Christian conservatives to overcome union opposition and gain control of local school boards in 
order to influence public school curriculum and services); Elizabeth Shogren & Douglas Frantz, 
Conservative Fire Spreads with School Board Sparks, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 11, 1993, at A1, available at 
http://articles.latimes.com/print/1993-12-11/news/mn-602_1_school-board [hereinafter Shogren & 
Frantz, Conservative Fire Spreads] (describing the efforts of Christian conservatives to overcome union 
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quickly grew into a national movement after Republican leaders seized on this 
legislation as an effective tactic to defund Democrats by preventing unions, a key 
funder for Democrats, from raising political funds. 
In the early-1990s, the Religious Right waged a national effort to gain control 
over local school districts by competing for seats on local school boards.129 Its 
goals included changes to the school curriculum, in some cases requiring the 
teaching of creationism while banning topics deemed immoral or overly secular 
like sex education, homosexuality, cultural diversity, and tolerance.130 The Right 
also sought to terminate social service programs that school districts provided for 
low-income families, such as Head Start and free school lunches.131 Some 
Christian conservatives believed such programs undermined the role of families 
because families, and not schools, should be providing these functions,132 
presumably even families too poor to afford to do so. The Right’s opponents 
included the teachers’ unions, which provided money and organization to mount 
effective challenges to the Right’s candidates in local school board races, and a 
coalition of liberal and moderate parents and like-minded organizations.133 
A second front in this battle formed along the Right’s legislative efforts to 
expand the use of school vouchers, which avoided the need to gain control over 
public school districts by allowing parents to bypass them entirely.134 Here, too, 
the teachers’ unions opposed the Right’s efforts, which the unions argued would 
undermine public schools by diverting public funds to private institutions. In 
1993, teachers’ unions spent millions to help defeat a ballot measure in California 
that would have expanded the use of vouchers.135 
 
opposition and gain control of local school boards in order to influence public school curriculum and 
services); Robert Dreyfuss, Paycheck Protection Racket, MOTHER JONES (Apr. 30, 1998), 
http://www.motherjones.com/politics/1998/05/paycheck-protection-racket (discussing the origins 
of the modern paycheck protection movement). See generally NAT’L EDUC. ASS’N, THE REAL STORY 
BEHIND PAYCHECK PROTECTION: THE HIDDEN LINK BETWEEN ANTI-WORKER AND ANTI-
PUBLIC EDUCATION INITIATIVES (1998) (describing the coordinated national network of 
conservative Christian organizations and conservative advocacy groups behind efforts to expand the 
use of school vouchers and reduce the political influence of unions, and noting that “‘paycheck 
protection’ may well have been a fight over the future of public education”). 
129. As one leader of the religious right observed: “Once you have a majority on a school 
board, you control the money, you control the books.” Shogren & Frantz, Religious Right’s New Pulpit, 
supra note 128; see also Shogren & Frantz, Conservative Fire Spreads, supra note 128. See generally ROBERT 
L. SIMONDS, HOW TO ELECT CHRISTIANS TO PUBLIC OFFICE (1985). 
130. Shogren & Frantz, Religious Right’s New Pulpit, supra note 128. 
131. See id. 
132. See id. 
133. See id. See generally MATTHEW FREEMAN, THE SAN DIEGO MODEL: A COMMUNITY 
BATTLES THE RELIGIOUS RIGHT (1993); DAVID C. JOHNSON & LEONARD M. SALLE,  
RESPONDING TO THE ATTACK ON PUBLIC EDUCATION & TEACHER UNIONS (2004),  
available at http://www.commonwealinstitute.org/cw/files/Responding_Ed_Report%20from%20CI 
%20website_0.pdf. 
134. See generally NAT’L EDUC. ASS’N, supra note 128. 
135. Dan Morain, Teachers Union Shows Clout in Fight Against Prop. 174, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 25, 
1993, at A3, available at http://articles.latimes.com/1993-10-25/news/mn-49658_1_public-school 
(describing political expenditures by teachers unions); Cal. Proposition 174, School Vouchers  
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In the wake of their defeat, three veterans of the failed 1993 school voucher 
measure from Orange County, California, began looking for a way to defund the 
political activity of the teachers’ unions. They founded the Education Alliance, a 
pro-school-voucher PAC that focused on electing conservative Christians to local 
school board positions and terminating the provision of many social services in 
public schools.136 One founder was also a former school board member who lost 
his seat after the California Teachers Association spent seventy thousand dollars 
to defeat him.137 The activists found inspiration in Washington’s Initiative 134 (I-
134), a comprehensive 1992 campaign finance reform ballot measure that passed 
with overwhelming support and established the state’s first contribution limits to 
candidates for statewide office. 
I-134 included among its many provisions an annual opt-in requirement for 
public or private sector workers wishing to use payroll deductions for political 
purposes.138 The following year the state’s Public Disclosure Commission issued a 
rule139 interpreting the law as applying only to PAC contributions, and not to 
political spending paid for with members’ dues.140 Two seemingly contradictory 
developments followed. First, the annual opt-in requirement had an enormous 
impact on participation rates, which for one union’s PAC declined from sixty-nine 
percent of membership to just fifteen percent of membership.141 But second, the 
law had only a minimal impact on workers’ overall political participation, as 
measured by total union political expenditures, because many workers retained 
their membership status and continued supporting their union’s political activities 
 
(1993), BALLOTPEDIA, http://ballotpedia.org/wiki/index.php/California_Proposition_174,_School 
_Vouchers_(1993) (last updated Nov. 12, 2012) (describing defeat of the measure). 
136. Paul F. Clark, Using Members’ Dues for Political Purposes: The “Paycheck Protection” Movement, 
20 J. LAB. RES. 329, 334–35 (1999); see also NAT’L EDUC. ASS’N, supra note 128, at 50; Dreyfuss, supra 
note 128 (discussing the origins of the modern paycheck protection movement). The Education 
Alliance’s platform included expanding charter schools and voucher programs, and ending the 
“socialistic idea that schools should become miniature welfare states which serve as distribution 
points for social services” such as school health clinics and breakfast programs for low-income 
children. Platform, EDUC. ALLIANCE, http://web.archive.org/web/20070630130352/http://www 
.education-alliance.org/index.cfm/about_us_platform.htm (archived July 2, 2007); see also School 
Breakfast Program (SBP), U.S. DEP’T AGRIC., http://www.fns.usda.gov/sbp/school-breakfast-program 
(last modified Mar. 5, 2014) (describing the USDA’s school breakfast program). 
137. Frank Ury lost his seat as a member of the Saddleback Unified School Board in 1996. 
NAT’L EDUC. ASS’N, supra note 128, at 47. 
138. Wash. Initiative Measure No. 134 (1992) (repealed 2002). The initiative was subsequently 
replaced by an annual notification requirement. 2002 Wash. Sess. Laws 622 (codified at WASH. REV. 
CODE ANN. §§ 42.17A.495.1(2)–(3) (West 2012)). The initiative also required nonmembers to opt-in 
each year to allow their agency fees to be used for political purposes, which the Supreme Court 
upheld as constitutional in 2007. Davenport v. Wash. Educ. Ass’n, 551 U.S. 177, 191–92 (2007) 
(holding Washington Revised Code section 42.17.760 does not violate the First Amendment). 
139. 93-16 Wash. Reg. 064 (Aug. 30, 1993) (codified at WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 390-17-100 
(West, Westlaw through 14-16 Wash. State Reg., Aug. 20, 2014)). 
140. In 2000, the Washington Supreme Court upheld the agency’s rule. State ex rel. Evergreen 
Freedom Found. v. Wash. Educ. Ass’n, 999 P.2d 602, 616 (2000). 
141. The union was the Washington Education Association, the state affiliate of the National 
Education Association. Id. at 620 n.13. 
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by paying dues.142 Thus, although political contributions by unions declined forty-
three percent in 1994, by the 1996 cycle they had rebounded to within thirteen 
percent of their pre-reform level.143 
In California, the voucher activists crafted a measure specifically focusing on 
union political fundraising that aimed at disabling a wider range of union political 
activities by expressly applying an annual opt-in requirement to political activities 
paid for with dues.144 Initial efforts to qualify the measure for the 1998 ballot 
foundered.145 But the campaign then caught the attention of House Republican 
Speaker Newt Gingrich and antitax lobbyist Grover Norquist, both of whom saw 
the legislation as a potential tactic to weaken unions nationally and as payback for 
unions’ thirty-five million dollar advertising blitz targeting freshman House 
Republicans in the 1996 election cycle, which had threatened the Republican 
House majority.146 Gingrich and Norquist helped channel out-of-state funding to 
support the California effort147 and launched drives to pass similar legislation in 
thirty states148 and in Congress,149 in many cases based on model legislation 
drafted by the American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC) in 1998.150 In just 
a few years, payroll-restriction laws had thus migrated from the political fringe to 
the conservative mainstream, and in 2000 the Republican Party added “Paycheck 
Protection” to its national platform.151 
 
142. Infra note 143. 
143. Samantha Sanchez & Linda Casey, Impact of Campaign Reform ( I-134) on Money in 
Washington State Politics, NAT’L INST. ON MONEY ST. POL. (Oct. 25, 1998), http:// 
www.followthemoney.org/research/institute-reports/impact-of-campaign-reform-i-134-on-money 
-in-washington-state-politics. 
144. See Proposition 226—Full Text of the Proposed Law, CAL. SECRETARY ST., 
http://primary98.sos.ca.gov/VoterGuide/Propositions/226text.htm (last visited May 30, 2014). 
145. David S. Broder, Calif. GOP’s Bid to Curb Union Funds Is Faltering, WASH. POST, May 26, 
1998, at A1. 
146. David S. Broder, Union Dues Initiative Causing Divisions for Nevada GOP, WASH. POST, May 
5, 1998, at A4. 
147. NAT’L EDUC. ASS’N, supra note 128, at 47. 
148. In several states, including Arizona, Colorado, Florida, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, 
and Ohio, legislation was introduced in addition to efforts to qualify a measure for the ballot. 
MICHAEL KAMBUROWSKI, AMS. FOR TAX REFORM, PAYCHECK PROTECTION: GIVING WORKERS 
A VOICE IN POLITICAL SPENDING 8, 29 (1998). 
149. In 1997, Senator Don Nickles (R-OK) introduced the Paycheck Protection Act (S. 9) and 
Congressman Harris Fawell (R-IL) introduced the Worker Paycheck Fairness Act (H.R. 1625). Both 
bills would have required unions to obtain annual written authorization from members before 
spending any portion of their dues for purposes other than on collective bargaining. Id. at 17. 
150. Broder, supra note 145 (describing efforts by Norquist and Gingrich); see also 
KAMBUROWSKI, supra note 148, at 22 (describing the role of ALEC). The American Legislative 
Exchange Council (ALEC) is a national association of conservative state legislators and corporations, 
is funded by corporations, and produces model legislation to advance conservative public policies. See 
What is ALEC?, ALEC EXPOSED, http://www.alecexposed.org/wiki/What_is_ALEC%3F (last 
modified Jan. 23, 2014). 
151. Republican Party Platform of 2000, AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT ( July 31, 2000), http:// 
www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=25849. 
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Proponents pursued four strategies to enact such laws using popular 
initiatives, legislatures, executive orders, and agency rulemaking. First, they made a 
major push in the late 1990s to follow the Washington model and qualify 
measures for the ballot.152 As measured by electoral success, these efforts 
resoundingly failed. Campaigns to qualify ballot measures failed in Colorado,153 
Arizona, Florida, Michigan (to expand the scope of prior legislation passed in 
1994), Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, Ohio, and Oklahoma,154 and a Nevada 
measure was removed from the ballot on First Amendment and other grounds.155 
Ballot measures qualified for the ballot in California and Oregon but were both 
defeated following heavy spending by unions.156 Nevertheless, these efforts 
continued. Between 1992 and 2012 at least twenty efforts were made in thirteen 
states to qualify ballot measures limiting unions’ use of payroll deductions for 
political purposes.157 Measures qualified for the ballot nine times in four states158 
and eleven additional efforts failed to qualify.159 
The persistent efforts to pass payroll restrictions by popular initiative in 
states with strong labor movements, such as California and Oregon, may be 
explained by an early insight by national Republican leaders that they did not 
actually need to win at the ballot to accomplish their objective of defunding union 
political activity. These leaders realized that even comparatively minor investments 
to qualify such measures for the ballot forced unions to spend huge sums in highly 
lopsided campaigns to defeat them. As Norquist boasted following the defeat of 
Proposition 226, a 1998 California initiative to impose payroll restrictions, “Even 
 
152. KAMBUROWSKI, infra note 148, at 8. 
153. David S. Broder, Oregon May Decide Epic Struggle Over Union Dues for Campaigns, WASH. 
POST, Oct. 12, 1998, at A13 (describing the failed effort to qualify a measure for the ballot in 
Colorado). 
154. KAMBUROWSKI, supra note 148, at 8; see also AMS. FOR TAX REFORM, PAYCHECK 
PROTECTION: THE STATES UPDATE OF LEGISLATION AND INITIATIVES IN PARTICIPATING 
STATES (1998), available at http://legacy library.ucsf.edu/tid/jiq26b00. 
155. NAT’L EDUC. ASS’N, supra note 128, at 59; SHERK, supra note 85, at 8 n.29. 
156. SHERK, supra note 85, at 8 n.29. 
157. Id. 
158. As noted, one measure qualified in Nevada, but was then removed from the ballot by the 
courts. NAT’L EDUC. ASS’N, supra note 128, at 59; SHERK, supra note 85, at 8 n.29. The other 
measures were Washington Initiative 134 (1992); Oregon Measures 59 (1998), 92 (2000), 98 (2000), 
and 64 (2008); and California Propositions 226 (1998), 75 (2005), and 32 (2012). In addition, in 
Colorado, one statewide measure, Amendment 49 (2008), and three municipal measures, Centennial 
200 (2007), Englewood 200 (2007), and Greeley 200 (2007), qualified for the ballot. These measures 
would have prohibited the use of payroll deductions for all union payments, including funds for 
political purposes as well as union dues. All of the measures failed except for Washington’s I-134 
(1992), and Colorado’s Centennial 200 (2007). Paycheck Protection on the Ballot, BALLOTPEDIA, 
http://ballotpedia.org/wiki/index.php/Paycheck_protection#tab=By_state (last updated June 15, 
2012). 
159. Measures in Colorado, Arizona, Florida, Michigan (to expand the scope of the 1994 
legislation), Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, Ohio, and Oklahoma all failed to qualify for the ballot in 
1998. KAMBUROWSKI, supra note 148, at 8; Broder, supra note 153. In addition, the “Protect Arizona 
Employee Checks” initiative in Arizona measured failed to qualify in 2008, and the “California 
Paycheck Protection Act” failed to qualify in 2010. Paycheck Protection on the Ballot, supra note 158. 
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when you lose, you force the other team to drain resources for no apparent 
reason.”160 In California, spending to defeat Proposition 75 in 2005 topped $54 
million, nearly all of it from unions, compared to just $5.8 million spent in support 
of the measure.161 Such sums, multiplied by numerous campaigns, represent a 
staggering opportunity cost to labor’s affirmative legislative agenda.162 For 
example, in 2012, unions contributed nearly all of the seventy-six million dollars 
spent to defeat California’s Proposition 32, limiting their ability to support another 
ballot measure on the 2012 ballot to temporarily raise taxes in order to prevent 
billions in cuts to public schools, for which they also provided the lion’s share of 
funding.163 
A second strategy focused on passing laws in state legislatures.164 1998 
marked the campaign’s first high water mark, when twenty-four states introduced 
legislation.165 States introduced a second wave of legislation in the wake of the 
Great Recession. The Recession added fresh momentum to the national 
movement in two ways. First, it opened yawning deficits in many states’ budgets, 
providing Republicans a pretext for an all-out assault on public employee 
unions.166 Second, it gave Republicans new ability to promote partisan legislation 
after the party gained complete control of state legislatures across the country in 
the 2010 cycle.167 Between 2009 and 2013 alone, at least forty-three payroll 
 
160. DANIEL A. SMITH & CAROLINE J. TOLBERT, CAMPAIGNS & ELECTIONS, EDUCATED 
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(2012), available at http://www.manhattan-institute.org/pdf/cr_72.pdf. 
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164. Unlike political donations made to support or defeat ballot measures, there is no single 
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which are measured as much in political capital as in campaign dollars. But given the ease of 
introducing bills in many state legislatures and the existential threat such laws may pose to unions’ 
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165. These states were Alaska (SB 151), Arizona (HB 1412), Colorado (HB 1302), 
Connecticut (HB 5327), Florida (SB 1552), Georgia (SB 497), Kansas (HB 2346), Maryland (HB 577), 
Massachusetts (HB 5402), Michigan (SB 650 and SB 651), Minnesota (SB 2840), Mississippi (HB 
1126 and HB 1598), Missouri (SB 814), New Mexico (HB 408), Ohio (HB 225), South Carolina (S 
1029), South Dakota (SB 185), Tennessee (SB 2493), Utah (SB 182), Vermont (HB 695), Washington 
(HB 2484, to expand I-134), West Virginia (HB 4430), Wisconsin (AB 624), and Wyoming (HB 162). 
Of these, only Wyoming’s bill passed. KAMBUROWSKI, supra note 148, at 10. 
166. See Catherine Fisk & Brian Olney, Labor and the States’ Fiscal Problems, in WHEN STATES 
GO BROKE: THE ORIGINS, CONTEXT, AND SOLUTIONS FOR THE AMERICAN STATES IN FISCAL CRISIS 
253 (Peter Conti-Brown & David A. Skeel, Jr. eds., 2012) (rebutting arguments that public employees 
were the cause of states’ budget crises following the Great Recession). 
167. Republicans gained control of twenty-two state legislative chambers, providing them with 
majorities in fifty-seven chambers compared to just thirty-nine for Democrats, with two tied. More 
significantly, Republicans took control of the entire legislature in twenty-five states, the most since 
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restriction bills were introduced in seventeen states.168 Measures passed in 
Alabama and Arizona; both were enjoined by courts on First Amendment 
grounds, although the Eleventh Circuit subsequently reversed the district court’s 
preliminary injunction of the Alabama law.169 Although Washington remains the 
 
1952. Tim Storey, Commentary, GOP Makes Historic State Legislative Gains in 2010, RASMUSSEN  
REP. (Dec. 20, 2010), http://www.rasmussenreports.com/public_content/political_commentary 
/commentary_by_tim_storey/gop_makes_historic_state_legislative_gains_in_2010. In addition, 
many states allow voters to directly qualify measures for the ballot, allowing proponents of paycheck 
protection to circumvent state legislatures under Democratic control. See Paycheck Protection on the 
Ballot, supra note 158 (listing paycheck protection ballot measures). 
168. In 2010, bills were introduced in Alabama (Act 761, passed but temporarily enjoined, 
Ala. Educ. Ass’n v. Bentley, 788 F. Supp. 2d 1283 (N.D. Ala. 2011), rev’d sub nom. Ala. Educ. Ass’n v. 
State Superintendent of Educ., 746 F.3d 1135 (11th Cir. 2014)), Georgia (SB 242, failed), New Jersey 
(A1382, carried over), Pennsylvania (HB 1220, failed), and Tennessee (HB 820, failed). One state, 
Michigan, introduced measures to expand the use of payroll deductions for political purposes (HB 
4245, HB 2484, HB 4997, and SB 830, all of which failed). 
In 2011, measures were introduced in Arizona (HCR 2032, SB 1325, and SCR 1028, all failed, 
and SB 1365, which passed, but was then enjoined, United Food & Commercial Workers Local 99 v. 
Brewer, 817 F. Supp. 2d 1118 (D. Ariz. 2011)), California (AB 1179, carried over), Florida (SB 830 
and HB 1021, both failed), Indiana (SB 542, failed), Kansas (HB 2130, carried over), Michigan (HB 
4052 and HB 4064, both failed), Mississippi (SB 2044, failed), Missouri (HB 466, HB 492, and SB 
202, carried over), New Hampshire (LSR 2248, failed), Pennsylvania (HB 942, failed), South Dakota 
(HB 1160, failed), and Tennessee (HB 159, HB 594, HB 599, SB 136, SB 401, and SB 784, all were 
carried over, and SB 113 and HB 130, which passed). One state, Texas, introduced legislation to 
expand the rights of deputy sheriffs to use payroll deductions for political purposes (HB 3494, failed). 
In 2012, measures were introduced in Louisiana (HB 88, HB 1023), Maryland (HB 694 and SB 
763, both passed) (requiring disclosure of the names and addresses of each contributor to a campaign 
finance entity using payroll deduction), New Jersey (A 1491), Michigan (HB 5085 and HB 5086, both 
passed), and Missouri (S 435 and H 1230, both failed). 
As of February 5, 2013, measures had already been introduced in Missouri (HB 64, SB 29, and 
SB 71). This list treats companion bills in bicameral legislatures as separate bills. 
This list includes only measures specifically targeting the use of payroll deductions by public 
sector workers to make political contributions to unions or their political committees. Other measures 
were introduced in many states that would encumber union political activity, but which did not 
specifically target payroll deductions for political purposes. See, e.g., Michigan Act 53 (enacted 2012, 
enjoined by Bailey v. Callaghan, 873 F. Supp. 2d 879 (E.D. Mich. 2012), rev’d, 715 F.3d 956 (6th Cir. 
2013)); North Carolina Senate Bill 727 (enacted 2012); Arizona SB 1555 (introduced 2011); Wisconsin 
Act 10 (enacted 2011, enjoined by Wis. Educ. Ass’n Council v. Walker, 824 F. Supp. 2d 856 (W.D. 
Wis. 2012), rev’d in part, 705 F.3d 640 (7th Cir. 2013)); Arizona HB 2103 (introduced 2012); Florida 
Senate Bill 1555 (introduced 2011) (all banning use of payroll deductions for union dues); see also 
Tennessee HB 160; SB 139 (introduced 2011) (prohibiting unions from contributing to political 
candidates); Illinois HB 4651 (introduced 2012) (limiting annual contributions to a PAC by any 
natural person, corporation, labor organization, or association).  
Data taken from http://www.ncsl.org/legislatures-elections/elections/database-of-campaign 
-finance-legislation.aspx (2010 through 2013; last visited Feb. 5, 2013); http://www.ncsl.org/issues 
-research/labor/2011-wage-and-hour-legislation.aspx (last visited Feb. 5, 2013); http://www 
.ncsl.org/issues–research/labor/collective-bargaining-legislation-database.aspx (last visited Feb. 5, 
2013); and state legislature websites. 
169. Ala. Educ. Ass’n v. Bentley, 788 F. Supp. 2d 1283, 1328 (N.D. Ala. 2011) (enjoining 
statute due to vagueness and overbreadth), rev’d sub nom. Ala. Educ. Ass’n v. State Superintendent of 
Educ., 746 F.3d 1135 (11th Cir. 2014); United Food and Commercial Workers Local 99 v. Brewer, 
817 F. Supp. 2d 1118, 1128 (D. Ariz. 2011) (enjoining statute due to underinclusiveness and 
viewpoint discrimination). 
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only state to pass payroll deduction legislation by voter initiative,170 eight states 
have passed legislation: Michigan (1994),171 Ohio (1995) (invalidated on First 
Amendment grounds),172 Idaho (1997),173 Wyoming (1998),174 Utah (2001),175 
Alabama (2010),176 Arizona (2011),177 and Tennessee (2011).178 
Republicans also sought to achieve by executive action what they were 
unable to accomplish through legislation. Thus, a third strategy focused on 
executive orders. In September 1998, on the heels of the defeat of Proposition 
226, California Governor Pete Wilson issued an executive order requiring state 
agencies and school districts to notify workers of their existing right to prohibit 
expenditure of their dues for political or ideological causes.179 At the federal level, 
two Republican presidents issued executive orders, later rescinded by two 
Democratic presidents, requiring federal contractors to notify their employees of 
their constitutional rights to withhold payment for union political and ideological 
activities.180 
A fourth strategy focused on agency rulemaking. Over the years, state 
election officials in several states sought to enact payroll restrictions by 
interpreting existing statutes to limit or even prevent the use of payroll deductions 
for political contributions or union dues.181 Courts have overturned most of these 
measures. 
 
170. Wash. Initiative Measure No. 134 (1992) (codified at WASH. REV. CODE ANN. 
§ 42.17A.500 (West 2012)). 
171. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 169.255(6) (West, Westlaw through 2014 Legis. Sess.); see also 
Mich. State AFL-CIO v. Miller, 103 F.3d 1240, 1253 (6th Cir. 1997) (upholding annual opt-in 
requirement for deductions to fund separate segregated fund or PAC). 
172. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3599.031(H) (West, Westlaw through 2013–2014 General 
Assemb.), invalidated by UAW Local Union 1112 v. Philomena, 700 N.E. 2d 936 (Ohio Ct. App. 1998). 
173. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 67-6605 (West 2006) (amended 2003). 
174. 1998 Wyo. Sess. Sp. Laws ch. 100, § 2 (codified at WYO. STAT. ANN. § 22-25-102(h) 
(West, Westlaw through 2014 Budget Sess.) (amended 2013)). 
175. UTAH CODE ANN. § 34-32-1.1 (West, Westlaw through 2014 General Sess.) (amended 
2012). 
176. ALA. CODE § 17-17-5 (West, Westlaw through 2014 Legis. Sess.), enjoined by Ala. Educ. 
Ass’n v. Bentley, 788 F. Supp. 2d 1283, 1328 (N.D. Ala. 2011), rev’d sub nom. Ala. Educ. Ass’n v. State 
Superintendent of Educ., 746 F.3d 1135 (11th Cir. 2014). 
177. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 23-361.02 (2012), enjoined by United Food & Commercial Workers 
Local 99 v. Brewer, 817 F. Supp. 2d 1118 (D. Ariz. 2011). 
178. TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-5-608(b)(6) (West, Westlaw through 2014 2d Legis. Sess.) 
(prohibiting collaborative conferencing between the board of education and professional employees 
on payroll deduction for political activities). 
179. Clark, supra note 136, at 339. 
180. In 1992, President George H.W. Bush issued Executive Order (E.O.) 12,800, requiring 
federal contractors to notify their employees of their Beck rights. Exec. Order No. 12,800, 57 Fed. 
Reg. 12,985 (Apr. 14, 1992). In 1993, President Clinton rescinded E.O. 12,800 by issuing E.O. 12,836. 
Exec. Order No. 12,836, 58 Fed. Reg. 7045 (Feb. 3, 1993). In 2001, President George W. Bush 
reinstated E.O. 12,800 by issuing E.O. 13,201. Exec. Order No. 13,201, 66 Fed. Reg. 11,221 (Feb. 22, 
2001). In 2009, President Obama revoked E.O. 13,201 by issuing E.O. 13,496. Exec. Order No. 
13,496, 74 Fed. Reg. 6107 (Feb. 4, 2009). 
181. In 1977, the Kentucky Registry of Election Finance notified the state Attorney General 
that a union’s use of a “reverse check-off” system which included an opt-out system for payroll 
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Unions and their allies have fought these measures through the political 
process and challenged the constitutionality of the most far-reaching measures in 
courts. The latter strategy, however, was significantly set back by the 2009 
Supreme Court decision in Ysursa v. Pocatello Education District. 
II. THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND THE LAW OF PAYROLL DEDUCTIONS 
Unions have been litigating the constitutionality of payroll-restriction laws 
since Washington passed the first such law in 1992.182 In 2009, the issue finally 
reached the Supreme Court. In Ysursa v. Pocatello Education Association, the Supreme 
Court declared constitutional an Idaho law prohibiting the use of payroll 
deductions for political purposes.183 The Court held that the law did not infringe 
upon the First Amendment because the payroll system was an example of 
government-subsidized speech, a doctrine which the Court had previously held 
allows the government to selectively subsidize certain instances of private 
conduct.184 However, Ysursa vastly expands the reach of the subsidized speech 
doctrine and thus raises troubling questions about possible new limits on First 
Amendment protections. 
Part II.A of this section describes the Ysursa case. Part II.B describes the two 
tenets of the First Amendment implicated by payroll-restriction laws, political 
speech (II.B.1) and content neutrality (II.B.2). Part II.B.3 discusses three general 
exceptions to the general rule requiring content neutrality: the unconstitutional 
conditions doctrine (II.B.3.a), the subsidized speech doctrine (II.B.3.b), and public 
forums (II.B.3.c). Part II concludes by reviewing the case law distinguishing 
between subsidized speech and public forums (II.B.3.d). 
A. Ysursa v. Pocatello Education Ass’n 
In Ysursa, the Court considered the constitutionality of Idaho’s 2003 
Voluntary Contributions Act (VCA), which prohibited the use of payroll 
 
deductions to the union’s PAC was “coercive” and violated the state’s corrupt practices act. The Sixth 
Circuit held the reverse check-off system was not coercive. Ky. Educators Pub. Affairs Council v. Ky. 
Registry of Election Fin., 677 F.2d 1125, 1134 (6th Cir. 1982). In 2006, the Colorado Secretary of 
State promulgated rules requiring unions to obtain annual permission from their members before 
using dues or contributions to fund political campaigns. A state appeals court upheld a lower court’s 
preliminary injunction upon finding a reasonable probability the Secretary exceeded her rulemaking 
authority and that the rule violated the First Amendment. Sanger v. Dennis, 148 P.3d 404, 409 (Colo. 
App. 2006). Also in 2006, the Michigan Secretary of State issued a declaratory ruling interpreting an 
existing statute as prohibiting use of a school district’s payroll system by employees to make 
contributions to their union’s PAC, because it would constitute both a “contribution” and 
“expenditure” prohibited by state campaign finance law even though the union PAC paid in advance 
all costs attributable to its use of payroll deductions. The state Supreme Court upheld the ruling. 
Mich. Educ. Ass’n v. Sec’y of State, 801 N.W.2d 35, 55–56 (Mich. 2011). 
182. See Wash. Fed’n of State Emps. v. State, 901 P.2d 1028, 1031 (Wash. 1995). 
183. Ysursa v. Pocatello Educ. Ass’n, 555 U.S. 353, 364 (2009). 
184. Id. at 358. 
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deductions for public and private sector unions’ “political activities.”185 Several 
unions challenged the law as violating the First Amendment.186 The district court 
upheld the law as applied to state employees, reasoning that the First Amendment 
creates no right to have the government subsidize the exercise of First 
Amendment rights.187 According to the district court, when the state agreed with 
the union representing its employees to allow employees to make contributions to 
the union through payroll deductions, the state was subsidizing union political 
speech because it was paying to administer the payroll system.188 The court noted, 
however, that the record was devoid of any evidence of the state’s actual cost of 
providing the prohibited political deductions.189 Thus, on the record, there was no 
evidence that the payroll deduction system actually constituted a public subsidy of 
employee political activity.190 The court found, however, that as applied to private 
sector and local government workers, the law implicated the First Amendment 
because no state funds were used to pay for the payroll systems191 and the unions 
had offered to pay the entire cost of the payroll program.192 The court classified 
the law as a content-based restriction because it applied only to political speech, 
triggering strict scrutiny,193 and struck down the law as applied to private sector 
and local government workers.194 
Idaho appealed the district court’s holding that the law was unconstitutional 
as applied to local government employees, although the unions did not appeal the 
holding that the law was constitutional as applied to state employees.195 The Ninth 
Circuit affirmed.196 In the Ninth Circuit, the state invoked a different strand of 
First Amendment law to defend the limitation on payroll deductions, which it 
raised for the first time on appeal.197 The state argued that the local government 
payroll systems are a nonpublic forum of the state and thus a lower level of 
scrutiny should apply.198 In a nonpublic forum, as in a limited public forum, 
 
185. Id. at 356–57. 
186. Id. at 358 (discussing arguments made by the union plaintiffs). 
187. Pocatello Educ. Ass’n v. Heideman, No. CV-03-0256-E-BLW, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
34494, at *7–8 (D. Idaho 2005), rev’d on other grounds, 561 F.3d 1048 (9th Cir. 2009) (reversing in 
accordance with Ysursa v. Pocatello Educ. Ass’n, 555 U.S. 353, 358 (2009)). 
188. Id. at *8–9. 
189. Id. at *16. 
190. See Case Commentary, Government Subsidies of Political Speech, 123 HARV. L. REV. 242, 251 
(2009) (observing that the state in Ysursa did not demonstrate it would incur much if any cost). 
191. Pocatello, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34494, at *8–9. 
192. Id. 
193. Id. at *12. 
194. Id. at *18. 
195. Pocatello Educ. Ass’n v. Heideman, 504 F.3d 1053 (9th Cir. 2007), rev’d on other grounds 
sub nom. Ysursa v. Pocatello Educ. Ass’n, 555 U.S. 353 (2009). 
196. Id. at 1068. 
197. Id. at 1060 n.5. 
198. Id. at 1059–60. Although it is unclear whether the nonpublic forum continues to exist as 
a distinct category following Martinez , the rules applied to nonpublic forums are identical to the rules 
applied to limited public forums. See Christian Legal Soc’y of Univ. of Cal., Hastings Coll. of Law v. 
Martinez, 561 U.S. 661 (2010). 
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government may restrict speech based on speaker or subject matter, provided the 
distinctions are viewpoint neutral and reasonable in light of the purpose served by 
the forum.199 The Ninth Circuit rejected the state’s argument, concluding that 
even though the state had ultimate control over local governments, the state was 
acting more as a regulator than a proprietor200 because it did not actually operate 
or control the local government payroll systems and therefore forum analysis did 
not apply.201 
The Supreme Court reversed. Chief Justice Roberts wrote the majority 
opinion, joined by Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito.202 The Court 
concluded that the government subsidy took the case outside the First 
Amendment’s protections against content-based regulations, stating, “Idaho does 
not suppress political speech but simply declines to promote it through public 
employer checkoffs for political activities.”203 The Court then applied the 
subsidized speech doctrine to payroll systems operated by state and local 
governments.204 The Court reasoned that even though no state funds subsidized 
local government payroll systems, state political subdivisions are merely 
departments of the state from which it “may withhold, grant or withdraw powers 
and privileges as it sees fit.”205 Because the First Amendment did not apply, the 
Court applied only rational basis review and found the law satisfied the state’s 
interest in avoiding the appearance of partisan political activity by both the state 
and its local governments.206 
Justice Ginsburg concurred in part and concurred in the judgment.207 She 
found the majority’s subsidized speech analysis unnecessary.208 Instead, Justice 
Ginsburg focused only on whether local government employees were more like 
state employees, for whom the parties had agreed the law was constitutional, or 
private sector employees, for whom the parties had agreed the law was 
unconstitutional, and opted for the former.209 
Justice Breyer concurred in part and dissented in the judgment.210 Like 
Justice Ginsburg, he agreed that local government employees were more like state 
employees.211 He disagreed, however, with the majority’s subsidized speech 
 
199. Pocatello Educ. Ass’n, 504 F.3d at 1059–60; see also Christian Legal Soc’y, 561 U.S. at 679 n.11 
(describing the rules for regulating speech in a limited public forum). 
200. Pocatello Educ. Ass’n, 504 F.3d at 1063. 
201. Id. at 1068. 
202. Justice Ginsburg joined in Parts I and III and concurred in the judgment. Ysura, 555 U.S. 
at 354. 
203. Id. at 361. 
204. Id. at 362. 
205. Id. (quoting Trenton v. New Jersey, 262 U.S. 182, 187 (1923)). 
206. Id. at 359. 
207. Id. at 364. 
208. Id. at 364–65 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). 
209. Id. 
210. Id. at 365 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
211. Id. 
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analysis, stating that the majority’s distinction between characterizing the VCA as 
“abridging” the freedom of speech versus merely “declining to promote” speech 
was neither practical nor likely to prove determinative.212 Justice Breyer suggested 
that a balancing test would provide a more useful analysis to determine “whether 
the statute imposes a burden upon speech that is disproportionate in light of the 
other interests the government seeks to achieve.”213 Applying this test, Justice 
Breyer stated that he would find the VCA constitutional but only if it applied even 
handedly among similar politically related contributions.214 He would have 
remanded the case to address this question, because although the VCA appears 
facially evenhanded, it may nevertheless have an uneven effect on labor-related 
deductions.215 
Justice Stevens dissented.216 He would have found the VCA unconstitutional 
in all its applications because he concluded that the law discriminated against labor 
unions and was intended to make it more difficult for unions to finance political 
speech.217 Justice Stevens reasoned that the law was both overinclusive and 
underinclusive with regard to Idaho’s asserted interest in avoiding the appearance 
or actuality of public employer involvement in partisan politics.218 The law was 
overinclusive because it applied to private employers, and underinclusive because 
it did not restrict contributions by public employees for charitable activities, which 
creates a risk of the appearance of political involvement similar to the risk posed 
by deductions for purely political activities.219 
Justice Souter wrote a separate dissent.220 He noted that although the 
government may impose reasonable subject-matter distinctions affecting speech 
on certain public property, it may not discriminate according to viewpoint.221 
Justice Souter then suggested that the VCA raised a reasonable suspicion of 
viewpoint discrimination because “a reader of the statute may fairly suspect that 
Idaho’s legislative object was not efficient, clean government, but that unions’ 
political viewpoints were its target, selected out of all the politics the State might 
filter from its public workplaces.”222 He observed, however, that the issue of 
viewpoint discrimination was not even before the Court, because the unions had 
not focused on this argument.223 Remanding the case to address this question 
would be problematic, he added, because a finding of viewpoint discrimination 
would leave the law undisturbed with regard to state employees, for whom the 
 
212. Id. at 365–66 (emphasis omitted) (quoting majority opinion at 355). 
213. Id. at 367. 
214. Id. at 368–69. 
215. Id. at 369–70. 
216. Id. at 370 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
217. Id. 
218. Id. at 371. 
219. Id. at 372. 
220. Id. at 375 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
221. Id. at 376. 
222. Id. at 377. 
223. Id. 
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unions had not challenged the VCA’s application.224 Justice Souter concluded that, 
for these reasons, the case made a poor vehicle to refine First Amendment 
doctrine and thus the writ of certiorari had been improvidently granted.225 
B. First Amendment Analysis 
Ysursa did more than merely uphold a payroll-restriction law. It also changed, 
or at least muddied, First Amendment law with regard to the subsidized speech 
and public forum doctrines. To appreciate the weakness in the Court’s reasoning 
and the potential impact of the case, it is helpful to first review the First 
Amendment principles implicated by payroll-restriction laws and the lines of cases 
the Court drew on—and, in some cases, extended or simply ignored. 
Payroll-restriction laws implicate two fundamental tenets of the First 
Amendment. First, they limit the amount of money available to spend on political 
campaigns, which the Court has held is political speech entitled to the highest level 
of First Amendment protection.226 Second, they regulate speech based in all cases 
on the speech’s subject matter, in some cases on the speaker, and arguably in 
many cases even on the viewpoint of the speech.227 
1. Political Speech 
The first tenet implicated by payroll-restriction laws is that spending money 
on political campaigns is political speech, which occupies “an area of the most 
fundamental First Amendment activities” where protections are “at their 
zenith.”228 Thus, the Court has repeatedly applied strict scrutiny to regulations that 
diminish the quantum of political speech and declared them unconstitutional.229 
Laws that directly limit the amount of money people may spend on political 
campaigns230 or the timing during which people may spend it231 violate the First 
Amendment. 
Even laws that do not prohibit political speech outright, but merely 
encumber or eliminate the most effective vehicle for speech while leaving 
alternative vehicles open, infringe upon the First Amendment and trigger strict 
scrutiny.232 In Meyer v. Grant, the Court declared unconstitutional a Colorado law 
 
224. Id. at 378. 
225. Id. 
226. See infra Part II.B.1. 
227. See infra Part II.B.2. 
228. Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 425 (1988). 
229. See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 340–41 (2010); Meyer, 486 U.S. at 423–24; 
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14–23, 44–45 (1976) (per curiam). The Court has drawn a distinction 
between expenditures, which may not be limited, and contributions to candidates, which may be 
limited, reasoning that contribution limits have little direct effect on speech and are justified by 
preventing the actuality or appearance of corruption. 
230. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 1. 
231. See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 377. 
232. See id. (stating the option to form PACs exempt from the ban on corporate speech “does 
not alleviate the First Amendment problems” because “PACs are burdensome alternatives; they are 
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prohibiting the use of paid petition circulators to gather signatures to qualify 
initiatives for the ballot.233 The Court observed that the law restricted the most 
efficient and economical vehicle for speech, and rejected the argument that the 
law’s burden on speech was permissible simply because other avenues of 
expression remained open.234 The Court explained, “The First Amendment 
protects appellees’ right not only to advocate their cause but also to select what 
they believe to be the most effective means for so doing.”235 The Court also 
expressly rejected the argument that Colorado’s power to ban voter initiatives 
entirely included within it the lesser power to limit political speech raised in 
initiative petitions.236 
Moreover, the selective provision of benefits that assist the speech of only 
certain speakers, whether through supplemental funding or the removal of 
fundraising restrictions, imposes a substantial burden on the speech of speakers 
who do not receive the preferential treatment and thus triggers strict scrutiny. In 
Arizona Free Enterprise Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, the Court declared 
unconstitutional an Arizona law providing supplemental public funding to political 
candidates who accept public financing and whose privately financed opponents, 
and the independent groups supporting them, spend beyond a certain limit.237 
And in Davis v. Federal Election Commission, the Court declared unconstitutional the 
“Millionaire’s Amendment,” a federal law increasing contribution limits for 
candidates whose self-financed opponents donate to their own campaigns beyond 
a certain limit.238 
Payroll-restriction laws appear to violate the core protection for political 
speech because they encumber or eliminate the most effective vehicle for unions’ 
political speech and thus significantly reduce the quantum of that speech. Like the 
paid circulator ban in Meyer, payroll-restriction laws eliminate the most efficient 
method for unions to raise political funds.239 Courts should find that under Meyer, 
such laws present an impermissible burden on speech notwithstanding the 
existence of alternative avenues for raising funds, such as cash payments or bank 
drafts. And courts should reject arguments that the power of states to eliminate 
payroll deductions for public employees entirely includes the lesser power to 
restrict their availability because the Court expressly rejected an analogous 
argument in Meyer.240 Nor should denominating the selective availability of payroll 
 
expensive to administer and subject to extensive regulations”); Buckley v. Am. Constitutional Law 
Found., 525 U.S. 182 (1999) (declaring unconstitutional a Colorado law that, inter alia, required 
people circulating petitions to gather signatures for ballot initiatives be registered voters); cf. Meyer, 486 
U.S. at 420 (applying exacting scrutiny). 
233. Meyer, 486 U.S. at 428. 
234. Id. at 424. 
235. Id. 
236. Id. at 424–25. 
237. Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806, 2829 (2011). 
238. Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. 724, 743–44 (2008). 
239. See supra note 9. 
240. Meyer, 486 U.S. at 424–25. 
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deductions as a benefit for those receiving it, rather than a penalty on those not 
receiving it, change a court’s analysis because the Court likewise rejected the 
selective provision of benefits aiding political speech in both Arizona Free Enterprise 
Club and Davis.241 The burden on speech payroll-restriction laws create should be 
sufficient to trigger the heightened scrutiny the Court has employed to strike 
down numerous campaign finance laws limiting the ability of corporations and 
unions to spend money on politics.242 In Ysursa, however, the Court sidestepped 
altogether the issue of whether the VCA could withstand heightened scrutiny by 
holding that the payroll system constituted a subsidy for speech to which the 
unions had no constitutional right, and that the law accordingly effected no First 
Amendment infringement at all.243 
2. Content Neutrality 
Payroll-restriction laws also implicate a second tenet of the First 
Amendment, which is that at bottom the First Amendment prohibits the 
government from regulating speech based on its content.244 Content-based 
regulations are “presumptively invalid” and must satisfy the most exacting 
scrutiny245 because they “pose the inherent risk that the Government seeks not to 
advance a legitimate regulatory goal, but to suppress unpopular ideas or 
information or manipulate the public debate through coercion rather than 
persuasion.”246 Content-based restrictions include regulations based upon the 
viewpoint of the speaker247 as well as regulations based upon the subject matter of 
the speech.248 More recently, the Court has emphasized that speaker-based 
regulations are similarly prohibited, particularly with regard to political speech, 
because they are simply another means to regulate content.249 However, even 
 
241. Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s, 131 S. Ct. at 2829; Davis, 554 U.S. at 743–44. 
242. See generally Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
243. Ysursa v. Pocatello Educ. Ass’n, 555 U.S. 353, 359 (2009). 
244. See Police Dep’t of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95–96 (1972) (“[A]bove all else, the First 
Amendment means that government has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its 
ideas, its subject matter, or its content.”). 
245. Ysursa, 555 U.S. at 358 (“Restrictions on speech based on its content are ‘presumptively 
invalid’ and subject to strict scrutiny.” (citation omitted)). 
246. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 641 (1994). 
247. See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 412–20 (1989) (applying strict scrutiny and 
striking down a state law prohibiting the desecration of the American Flag as impermissibly viewpoint 
based). 
248. See, e.g., Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002) (applying strict scrutiny 
and striking down a state law prohibiting candidates for elected judicial office from making statements 
about disputed legal issues or the political process as impermissibly based upon the subject matter of 
the speech). 
249. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 340–41 (2010) (“Prohibited, too, are restrictions 
distinguishing among different speakers, allowing speech by some but not others. . . . Speech 
restrictions based on the identity of the speaker are all too often simply a means to control 
content. . . . We find no basis for the proposition that, in the context of political speech, the 
Government may impose restrictions on certain disfavored speakers.”); see also Sorrell v. IMS Health 
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regulations of speech that are content neutral, meaning they apply to all speech 
regardless of its message, must still withstand the heightened review of 
intermediate scrutiny.250 By contrast, regulations falling outside the First 
Amendment receive only the highly deferential rational basis review.251 
Payroll-restriction laws appear to infringe the content neutrality principle for 
three reasons. First, because all payroll laws single out political speech, they are 
clear examples of facial subject matter restrictions.252 The laws regulate speech 
based on its topic: speech is restricted if it is political, but not if it is 
nonpolitical.253 Second, some payroll laws apply on their face only to unions.254 
These laws are thus a form of speaker-based regulation as well. However, as 
discussed above, in Ysursa the Court held the First Amendment was not 
implicated and thus such content-based regulations based upon subject matter and 
speaker did not trigger heightened scrutiny.255 
Third, arguably many payroll-restriction laws discriminate according to 
viewpoint. The Ysursa Court did not reach the issue of whether the Idaho law 
constituted viewpoint discrimination. This is highly significant because the Court 
considers viewpoint discrimination to be so invidious that it is prohibited even in 
instances of subsidized speech, where other forms of content-based restrictions 
are permissible.256 However, the analysis of whether facially neutral payroll-
restriction laws, whose provisions apply to all employee political contributions 
irrespective of the recipient, represent viewpoint discrimination is more 
complicated than analyses of other forms of content-based discrimination. This is 
because the Court has not been entirely consistent in its willingness to consider a 
 
Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2667 (2011) (applying “heightened scrutiny” because the challenged law imposes 
a speaker- and content-based burden on protected expression). 
250. Such laws must meet intermediate scrutiny, meaning the law must further an important 
governmental interest without burdening substantially more speech than is necessary. See Turner, 512 
U.S. at 623 (holding a federal law requiring cable companies to carry local broadcast stations is 
content neutral because it applied to all stations regardless of their programming, and remanding for 
the application of intermediate scrutiny); Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989). 
251. See Ysursa v. Pocatello Educ. Ass’n, 555 U.S. 353, 359 (2009). 
252. E.g., Pocatello Educ. Ass’n v. Heideman, 504 F.3d 1053, 1058 (9th Cir. 2007) (noting 
union’s argument that the law is a content-based restriction, but holding the law does not implicate 
the First Amendment because it involves a public subsidy), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. Ysursa, 555 
U.S. at 358. 
253. See, e.g., id. 
254. E.g., Ysursa, 555 U.S. at 371 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (identifying provisions of Idaho’s 
Voluntary Contribution Act that pertain exclusively to unions); S.B. 29, 97th General Assemb., First 
Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2013). 
255. Ysursa, 555 U.S. at 359. 
256. Compare Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 548 (1983), with 
Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498, 513 (1959). The Court uses the phrases “aim[ed] at the 
suppression of dangerous ideas” and “viewpoint discrimination” interchangeably. Bailey v. Callaghan, 
715 F.3d 956, 962 n.2 (6th Cir. 2013) (alteration in original) (citing Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors 
of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 834 (1995); Nat’l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 587 
(1998)). 
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law’s purpose to prove content-based discrimination, as opposed to focusing only 
upon whether its text is facially neutral.257 
The Court has stated that the government’s purpose is not simply relevant 
but dispositive to an analysis of content neutrality. In Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 
the Court explained that “[t]he government’s purpose is the controlling 
consideration” in determining whether a law is content neutral.258 
The Court approved the use of purpose, albeit in less categorical terms, in 
two other cases in which it articulated contradictory uses to which purpose could 
be put. In Renton v. Playtime Theaters, Inc., the Court embraced the use of purpose to 
prove that facially content-based laws are in fact content neutral.259 The Court 
rejected a First Amendment challenge to a zoning ordinance limiting the places 
where adult motion picture theaters could be located.260 Even though the law was 
facially content based because it singled out only those movie theaters showing 
films with sexual content, the Court analyzed the law as content neutral because it 
found the law was motivated by the City Council’s desire to regulate the secondary 
effects adult theaters produce, such as crime and the depression of property 
values.261 Thus, Renton stands for the proposition that laws that are facially content 
based may be analyzed under the more deferential scrutiny required by content-
neutral laws if they have the content-neutral purpose and effect of regulating the 
undesirable secondary effects of speech. Although the Court did not expressly 
address when facially neutral laws will be found to be content based because of 
their purpose or impact, scholars have argued there is no reason why this analysis 
should be relevant only when analyzing laws that are facially discriminatory.262 
The Court affirmed the use of purpose to prove a law is content based in 
Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Federal Communications Commission. The Court stated 
that “a content-based purpose may be sufficient in certain circumstances to show 
that a regulation is content based,” although “it is not necessary to such a showing 
in all cases.”263 However, the Court then added a qualifier that presented precisely 
the opposite view articulated in Renton as to what uses purpose could be put.264 
Under Turner, purpose is effectively a one way ratchet that can be used to prove 
content-based discrimination, but not to prove that a facially discriminatory law is 
in fact content neutral: “Nor will the mere assertion of a content-neutral purpose 
be enough to save a law which, on its face, discriminates based on content.”265 
 
257. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 32, at 967 & n.49–50; see infra notes 258–274 and 
accompanying text. 
258. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989). 
259. City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 47–48 (1986). 
260. Id. at 43. 
261. Id. at 47–48. 
262. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 32, at 967 & n.49–50 (describing Renton and citing scholars 
arguing laws should be treated as content based if their purpose is to restrict certain messages or if 
their effect is to discriminate against specific topics or views). 
263. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 642 (1994). 
264. Id. at 642–43. 
265. Id. 
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The Court then appeared to abandon the use of purpose to prove 
discrimination based on content in Hill v. Colorado.266 In Hill, the Court upheld a 
Colorado statute that prohibited approaching a person near a health care facility, 
without consent, for the purpose of oral protest, education, or counseling.267 The 
Court treated the law as content neutral268 because it applied on its face to an 
extremely broad category of communications,269 even though it was adopted with 
the purpose of singling out speech by antiabortion protesters.270 The Court noted 
in dicta that facially neutral laws do not become content based simply because 
they are motivated by a desire to limit speech on one side of a partisan debate, nor 
just because they are applied to only a specific location where that discourse 
occurs.271 
In Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., the pendulum swung back again toward allowing 
the use of purpose to prove content-based discrimination. The Court made no 
reference to Hill and reasserted the principle that a facially neutral law with a 
discriminatory purpose is not content neutral.272 The Court offered the 
hypothetical case of “[a] government bent on frustrating an impending 
demonstration [that] might pass a law demanding two years’ notice before the 
issuance of parade permits.”273 In such a case, the Court explained, “[e]ven if the 
hypothetical measure on its face appeared neutral as to content and speaker, its 
purpose to suppress speech . . . would render it unconstitutional.”274 
Ultimately, it is difficult to reconcile the Court’s cases with regard to whether 
and when a court may use the purpose and effect of a facially neutral law to prove 
viewpoint discrimination, but there is certainly authority suggesting it can. Ward, 
Turner, and Sorrell suggest that facially neutral laws passed with the purpose of 
discriminating against certain speech because of its message are unconstitutional. 
There is direct evidence that many payroll-restriction laws are motivated by a 
desire to discriminate against union political speech. For example, in Michigan the 
state defended House Bill 4929, which banned the use of payroll deduction for 
union dues, by arguing the law was a “check on union power.”275 And during the 
effort to pass Act 10 in Wisconsin, which included a ban on the payroll deduction 
of union dues, the Republican Senate Majority Leader argued that “[i]f we win this 
battle, and the money is not there under the auspices of the unions, certainly what 
you’re going to find is President Obama is going to have a . . . much more difficult 
 
266. Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703 (2000). 
267. Id. at 735. 
268. Id. at 725–26. 
269. Id. at 723–24. 
270. Id. at 715; id. at 741, 744 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
271. Id. at 724–25 (majority opinion). 
272. Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2663 (2011). 
273. Id. at 2664. 
274. Id. 
275. See Bailey v. Callaghan, 715 F.3d 956, 961 (6th Cir. 2013) (Stranch, J., dissenting). 
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time getting elected and winning the state of Wisconsin.”276 Moreover, the effect 
of payroll-restriction laws falls almost entirely on unions, and not corporations. 
While evidence of the purpose of the Michigan and Wisconsin laws and the effect 
of all payroll-restriction laws is inadequate to prove viewpoint-based 
discrimination under Hill, such evidence could be sufficient under Sorrell and 
possibly even under a broad reading of Renton. 
Even without a showing of viewpoint discrimination, all payroll-restriction 
laws should trigger strict scrutiny because they discriminate based on subject 
matter and, in some cases, on speaker identity as well. However, as discussed in 
greater detail below, the issue of viewpoint-neutrality is especially important in the 
context of various doctrines permitting at least some forms of content 
discrimination. 
3. When Do Exceptions to Content Neutrality Apply? 
To understand why courts have allowed payroll-restriction laws to stand thus 
requires a review of some of the doctrines determining when exceptions to the 
general content-neutrality rule prohibiting discrimination by subject matter, 
viewpoint, and speaker apply to government benefits implicating speech. These 
doctrines include the unconstitutional conditions doctrine, which limits the 
government’s ability to place conditions on the provision of benefits it is not 
constitutionally required to provide in the first place;277 the subsidized speech 
doctrine, which allows the government to selectively provide benefits that support 
private speech;278 the government speech doctrine, which provides the 
government even greater latitude to discriminate when the government and not a 
private party is the speaker;279 and the public forum doctrine, which limits the 
government’s ability to regulate speech on government property.280 Although 
these doctrines frequently overlap, demarcating the boundaries separating each 
doctrine is crucial because each carries very different levels of protection for 
speech. Ysursa upends this delicate architecture by collapsing the distinctions even 
further and providing the government unprecedented latitude to regulate speech 
in discriminatory ways.281 
a. Unconstitutional Conditions 
Payroll-restriction laws do not prevent public employees from engaging in 
 
276. Wis. Educ. Ass’n Council v. Walker, 705 F.3d 640, 652 (7th. Cir. 2013) (alteration in 
original) (citation omitted). Even though both the Michigan and Wisconsin laws targeted only specific 
unions, in each case the court found the law facially neutral. I argue that the court in each case 
reached the wrong result, and present these cases as illustrations of the competing approaches to 
proving content-based discrimination. 
277. See infra Part II.B.3.a. 
278. See infra notes 311–318 and accompanying text. 
279. See infra notes 319–324 and accompanying text. 
280. See infra Part II.B.3.c. 
281. See infra Part III.B. 
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political speech; they merely make a payroll system unavailable (or less available) 
for that purpose. Nevertheless, the Court has held that the selective provision of 
government benefits may represent an unconstitutional condition that infringes 
the First Amendment.282 
The unconstitutional conditions doctrine limits the government’s ability to 
restrict access to benefits in ways that interfere with constitutional rights.283 It thus 
broadens the content-neutrality rule by preventing the government from using its 
benefits to “produce a result which (it) could not command directly.”284 The 
doctrine stands for the principle that the “[government] may not deny a benefit to 
a person” because he exercises a constitutional right285 and thus may not condition 
a benefit on the relinquishment of that right. Accordingly, the unconstitutional 
conditions doctrine operates as a general rule prohibiting the infringement of 
constitutional rights through the selective provision of benefits or subsidies. The 
Court, however, has nevertheless carved out a gaping exception,286 which it 
applied in Ysursa.287 
The Court has used the unconstitutional conditions doctrine to declare 
unconstitutional laws permitting the government to condition the receipt of 
benefits on the recipient’s relinquishment of his First Amendment rights, even 
though the government could have chosen not to provide the benefit at all. In 
Speiser v. Randall, the Court struck down a California law conditioning the receipt 
of a veterans’ property tax exemption on a requirement that the recipient sign a 
declaration stating he did not advocate the forcible overthrow of the 
government.288 The Court again applied the doctrine in Federal Communication 
Commission v. League of Women Voters to strike down a content-based law 
conditioning the receipt of federal funds by noncommercial educational 
broadcasting stations on the stations relinquishing their right to editorialize.289 
However, the Court found no unconstitutional condition existed in a trio of 
cases where benefits were clearly conditioned on foregoing protected speech. In 
Cammarano v. United States, the Court upheld a treasury regulation denying tax 
deductions for lobbying expenditures.290 The case concerned sizable contributions 
 
282. See infra notes 288–289. 
283. See Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972). 
284. Id. (quoting Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526 (1958)). 
285. Id. 
286. See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991); Regan v. Taxation with Representation of 
Wash., 461 U.S. 540 (1983); Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498 (1959) (each limiting the 
application of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine). Professor Cass Sunstein argues the narrow 
reach and inconsistent application of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine is explained by the fact 
that it is ill equipped to safeguard constitutional rights in the modern regulatory state and accordingly 
should be abandoned. Cass R. Sunstein, Why The Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine Is an Anachronism 
(with Particular Reference to Religion, Speech, and Abortion), 70 B.U. L. REV. 593 (1990). 
287. Ysursa v. Pocatello Educ. Ass’n, 555 U.S. 353, 358 (2009) (citing Regan, 461 U.S. at 549). 
288. Speiser, 357 U.S. at 529. 
289. FCC v. League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U.S. 364, 402 (1984). 
290. Cammarano, 358 U.S. at 498. 
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by liquor distributors to political campaigns urging the defeat of two laws that 
would have put them out of business, either by placing all sales in the hands of the 
state or by implementing prohibition.291 The distributors challenged the regulation 
excluding such expenditures from those expenditures deductible for income tax 
purposes as “ordinary and necessary” business expenses.292 The Court 
distinguished Speiser, explaining that the distributors “are not being denied a tax 
deduction because they engage in constitutionally protected activities, but are 
simply being required to pay for those activities entirely out of their own 
pockets.”293 Justice Douglas concurred, explaining that an unconstitutional 
condition would have resulted only if the regulation had denied deductions for all 
otherwise qualifying expenditures to taxpayers making any political expenditures, 
and not simply denied deductions only for the political expenditures themselves.294 
The Court followed Cammarano in upholding another law denying a tax 
subsidy for political expenditures in Regan v. Taxation With Representation.295 
Taxation With Representation (TWR), a nonprofit designated as a 501(c)(4) and 
engaged in lobbying on tax policy issues, challenged its denial of 501(c)(3) status, 
which is unavailable to nonprofits engaged in substantial lobbying activities.296 
Although neither 501(c)(3)s nor 501(c)(4)s pay taxes, donations are tax deductible 
for donors only when made to 501(c)(3)s.297 However, this valuable subsidy was 
nevertheless made available to donors to veterans’ groups that engaged in 
lobbying.298 The Court once again distinguished Speiser by reasoning that the 
government was not denying TWR a benefit on account of its lobbying, but 
simply refusing to subsidize its lobbying activities.299 Justice Blackmun concurred, 
reasoning that the rule was constitutional only because nonprofits were permitted 
to maintain dual structures consisting of a 501(c)(3) to fund all nonlobbying 
activities and a 501(c)(4) to fund lobbying.300 The denial of the subsidy was thus 
limited to only the proscribed activity, and was not imposed as a general penalty. 
In Rust v. Sullivan, the Court extended Regan to uphold a federal regulation 
interpreting Title X of the Public Health Services Act.301 Title X is a federal grant 
program that funds community clinics for the purpose of expanding family 
planning services to low-income families.302 The challenged regulation prohibited 
 
291. Id. at 500–03. 
292. Id. 
293. Id. at 513. 
294. Id. at 515 (Douglas, J., concurring). 
295. Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540 (1983). 
296. Id. at 542. 
297. Id. at 543. 
298. Id. at 546. 
299. Id. at 544–45. 
300. Id. at 552–53 (Blackmun, J., concurring); see also Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 197–98 
(1991) (discussing Regan). 
301. Rust, 500 U.S. at 177–78. 
302. Id. at 178. 
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Title X recipients from counseling or providing referrals for abortion.303 The 
Court distinguished League of Women Voters by reasoning that that case involved 
conditions on the recipient of the subsidy rather than on a particular program or 
service, “thus effectively prohibiting the recipient from engaging in the protected 
conduct outside the scope of the federally funded program.”304 The Court 
contrasted League of Women Voters with the restrictions on Title X, which applied 
only to the use of Title X funds and thus left Title X recipients free to spend their 
non-Title X funds however they chose.305 Thus, the Court reasoned, the 
prohibitions Congress included in Title X were not infringing constitutionally 
protected speech, but merely selectively subsidizing certain speech.306 The Court 
explained, “The Government can, without violating the Constitution, selectively 
fund a program to encourage certain activities it believes to be in the public 
interest, without at the same time funding an alternative program which seeks to 
deal with the problem in another way.”307 
Cammarano, Regan, and Rust severely limit the scope of the unconstitutional 
conditions doctrine and the protection for speech that it provides. In each of 
these cases the Court cognized a government benefit as a government subsidy and 
upheld the conditioning of the subsidy on the recipient’s relinquishment of a 
constitutional right. These cases thus stand for the proposition that government 
may condition the provision of subsidies on the relinquishment of First 
Amendment rights so long as the condition does not limit protected speech falling 
outside the scope of the benefit.308 As a result, lower courts have rejected 
arguments that payroll-restriction laws are unconstitutional conditions.309 In 
Ysursa, the Court implicitly invoked this rule by quoting Regan’s holding that a 
“legislature’s decision not to subsidize the exercise of a fundamental right does not 
infringe the right.”310 Thus, even though payroll-restriction laws prohibit or limit 
the use of the payroll system to engage in political speech, courts have held they 
are not an unconstitutional condition because they do not limit the ability of 
public employees to engage in political speech outside the scope of the payroll 
system. 
 
303. Id. at 177–78. 
304. Id. at 197. 
305. Id. at 198 & n.5. 
306. Id. at 193. 
307. Id. 
308. Cf. Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 538, 549 (2001) (striking down 
conditions on a subsidy provided by the Legal Services Corporation (LSC) because “[t]he prohibitions 
apply to all of the activities of an LSC grantee, including those paid for by non-LSC funds”). 
309. Ala. Educ. Ass’n v. Bentley, 788 F. Supp. 2d 1283, 1310 (N.D. Ala. 2011), rev’d sub nom. 
Ala. Educ. Ass’n v. State Superintendent of Educ., 746 F.3d 1135 (11th Cir. 2014). The courts have 
resolved other challenges to payroll-restriction laws without even discussing the unconstitutional 
conditions doctrine. See, e.g., Ysursa v. Pocatello Educ. Ass’n, 555 U.S. 353 (2009). 
310. Ysursa, 555 U.S. at 358 (quoting Regan v. Taxation With Representation, 461 U.S. 540, 
549 (1983)). 
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 b. Subsidized Speech 
As Cammarano, Regan, and Rust make clear, when the government conditions 
the provision of benefits on the abridgment of constitutional rights but limits the 
scope of the abridgments to the scope of the benefit, courts analyze the 
constitutionality of the conditions under the subsidized speech doctrine rather 
than the unconstitutional conditions doctrine.311 The subsidized speech doctrine 
thus diminishes the reach of the content-neutrality rule and permits at least some 
forms of content discrimination. In Ysursa, the Court applied the subsidized 
speech doctrine to uphold Idaho’s payroll-restriction law.312 The Court’s holding 
substantially broadened the reach of the doctrine because of important differences 
between a payroll system and the subsidies analyzed in the precedent cases.313 
However, the Court failed to even acknowledge this development and provided 
no reasoning to indicate the new reach of the doctrine or its remaining limits. 
The Court’s holding is significant because of the extent to which the 
subsidized speech doctrine weakens First Amendment protections against 
content-based discrimination. First, the subsidized speech doctrine permits 
subject-matter distinctions. In Cammarano and Regan, the subsidies were selectively 
applied based on subject matter, because they were available for nonpolitical 
expenditures but not for political or lobbying expenditures.314 In each case, the 
Court upheld the distinctions by reasoning that the denial of the subsidy was 
simply Congress’s decision not to subsidize certain activity out of the public 
fisc.315 
Second, the subsidized speech doctrine permits speaker-based distinctions. 
In Regan, the subsidy was selectively applied in a second manner, based on 
speaker: the subsidy was available for all nonprofit activities by veterans, but only 
for nonlobbying activities by nonveterans.316 
Third, viewpoint discrimination is forbidden in subsidy cases involving 
private speech, but permitted in subsidy cases involving the government’s own 
speech. In both Cammarano and Regan, the Court upheld the challenged laws 
because they were viewpoint neutral; that is, they were not “aimed at the 
suppression of dangerous ideas.”317 Both cases involved speech by the private 
organizations seeking access to the subsidy.318 
 
311. See Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498, 501–04 (1959); see also Rust, 500 U.S. at 
176; Regan, 461 U.S. at 547. 
312. See Ysursa, 555 U.S. at 362–65. 
313. Id. at 364. 
314. Regan, 461 U.S. at 541–46; Cammarano, 358 U.S. at 505–09. 
315. Regan, 461 U.S. at 547–50; Cammarano, 358 U.S. at 510–13. 
316. See Regan, 461 U.S. at 551–52. Although both 501(c)(3)s and 501(c)(4)s receive at least 
some subsidies in the form of an exemption from paying income taxes, this statement refers to the 
specific subsidy at issue in Regan, which is the ability of donors to claim a tax deduction for their 
contributions to the nonprofit. Even though only the donor receives this subsidy, the nonprofit also 
derives a substantial benefit because the subsidy lowers the cost of the donations it receives and thus 
facilitates larger donations. 
317. See id. at 548; Cammarano, 358 U.S. at 513. As noted, the Court uses the phrases “aimed at 
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However, viewpoint discrimination is permitted in subsidy cases involving 
government speech. In its most basic formulation, the government speech 
doctrine allows the government to selectively apply subsidies to advance its public 
policy objectives without the need to satisfy heightened scrutiny under the First 
Amendment, which would render many of its policy goals unattainable.319 As the 
Court explained in Rust, “[W]hen Congress established a National Endowment for 
Democracy to encourage other countries to adopt democratic principles, it was 
not constitutionally required to fund a program to encourage competing lines of 
political philosophy such as communism and fascism.”320 In Rust, the Court 
upheld a viewpoint-based restriction on speech favoring abortion as an option in 
family planning. As the Court explained in a later opinion, “viewpoint-based 
funding decisions can be sustained in instances in which the government is itself 
the speaker, or instances, like Rust, in which the government ‘used private speakers 
to transmit specific information pertaining to its own program.’”321 Thus, by 
upholding a gag order prohibiting abortion referrals or counseling by doctors 
working in private clinics receiving federal Title X funds, Rust extends the 
government speech doctrine to include even some speech by private speakers 
receiving government subsidies.322 
Notably, the Court in Ysursa never suggested that Idaho’s public sector 
payroll systems should be considered government speech. Nor should it have. 
Unlike the Title X program in Rust, Idaho’s electronic payroll systems and the 
automatic deductions they enable include no programmatic elements.323 Stated 
 
the suppression of dangerous ideas” and “viewpoint discrimination” interchangeably. See Nat’l 
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CHEMERINSKY, supra note 32, at 1013. 
323. See Ysursa v. Pocatello Educ. Ass’n, 555 U.S. 353, 359–60 (2009). 
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differently, government support for the payroll system provides a vehicle for 
speech but includes no message. Unlike Rust, which concerns a government 
program requiring employees of Title X grantees to engage in certain speech—by 
providing family planning counseling while refraining from abortion-related 
counseling—Ysursa concerns a government payroll system that does not require 
government employees to engage in any speech whatsoever.324 
Thus, by holding that a government payroll system is subsidized speech, the 
Court in Ysursa permitted content-based discrimination based on both subject 
matter and speaker, but not on viewpoint. As a result, it upheld a law denying 
payroll deductions only to speech concerning politics, and only to speakers 
wishing to make contributions to unions. 
 c. Public Forums 
Public forums are an important exception to the subsidized speech doctrine. 
Courts traditionally apply forum analysis “to determine when a governmental 
entity, in regulating property in its charge, may place limitations on speech.”325 
This is because the forum doctrine exempts certain government properties from 
the general rule requiring content-based regulations to survive strict scrutiny.326 In 
the subsidized speech context, however, where most content-based regulations are 
permitted, forum analysis serves the opposite purpose by determining those areas 
in which the general rule permitting content-based regulation does not apply.327 
Although the Ninth Circuit analyzed whether Idaho’s local government payroll 
systems constituted a forum, the Supreme Court in Ysursa ignored the doctrine 
entirely and thus gave no indication when and where it should apply with regard 
to public payroll systems or other similar public sector administrative functions.328 
The Court has identified several types of forums, each with different rules 
limiting the extent to which government may regulate the speech allowed in that 
particular forum. The classification is thus frequently determinative as to whether 
a law regulating speech in a particular forum violates the First Amendment. In 
Christian Legal Society v. Martinez , the Court identified three types of forums and 
described the rules governing each.329 The first type is the “traditional public 
forum,” which includes places that have traditionally been available for speech, 
such as streets and parks. Any content-based restriction must satisfy strict 
scrutiny.330 Second is the “designated public forum,” which arises when 
“government property that has not traditionally been regarded as a public forum is 
 
324. Id. at 356–58. 
325. Christian Legal Soc’y Chapter of Univ. of Cal., Hastings Coll. of Law v. Martinez, 561 
U.S. 661, 679 (2010). 
326. Id. at 678–80. 
327. Rust, 500 U.S. at 199–200. 
328. See Ysursa, 555 U.S. at 358–62. 
329. See Christian Legal Soc’y, 561 U.S.  at 679–83. 
330. Id. at 679 n.11; Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 
(1983). 
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intentionally opened up for that purpose.”331 As in the traditional public forum, 
content-based restriction in designated public forums must satisfy strict 
scrutiny.332 The third type of forum is the “limited public forum,” which the 
government creates when it opens public property “limited to use by certain 
groups or dedicated solely to the discussion of certain subjects.”333 Unlike the 
public and designated public forums, in a limited public forum, speaker-based and 
subject matter based restrictions are permissible so long as they are reasonable and 
viewpoint neutral.334 
Forum analysis is relevant to the subsidized speech doctrine because a forum 
need not be a physical place, but can include “metaphysical” forms of government 
property335 such as a university’s student activities fund,336 a workplace charity 
drive,337 or public school mailing facilities.338 Thus, any government subsidy could 
potentially qualify as a forum. The ability to apply forum analysis to public payroll 
systems is critical to the Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence because although 
the rules governing a limited public forum appear to be identical to those 
governing subsidized speech that is not government speech, the rules governing 
public forums and designated public forums provide far greater protections for 
speech.339 
 d. When is a subsidy a forum? 
A threshold question in forum analysis is when to apply forum analysis at all. 
The Court has never articulated criteria for determining when a subsidy should be 
treated as a forum and when it should be treated as a subsidy. However, criteria 
 
331. Christian Legal Soc’y, 561 U.S. at 679 n.11 (quoting Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 
U.S. 460, 469 (2009)). 
332. Id. (quoting Pleasant Grove, 555 U.S. at 470). 
333. Id. 
334. Id. This typology does not mention the nonpublic forum, to which the same rules apply 
as in a limited public forum. See, e.g., Pocatello Educ. Ass’n v. Heideman, 504 F.3d 1053, 1059 (9th 
Cir. 2007) (rejecting the argument that Idaho’s local government payroll systems are a nonpublic 
forum), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. Ysursa v. Pocatello Educ. Ass’n, 555 U.S. 353 (2009); see also 
Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788 (1985) (holding the Combined Federal 
Campaign (CFC) is a nonpublic forum). 
335. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 830 (1995). 
336. Id. 
337. See Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 809 (finding the CFC to be a forum). 
338. See Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 46 (1983) (finding 
that mailing facilities are forum). 
339. Subsidized speech and limited public forums both permit subject matter and speaker 
based distinctions but prohibit viewpoint discrimination. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 833–36. Content-
based restrictions in limited public forums must be “reasonable in light of the purpose served by the 
forum.” Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 806. In subsidized speech cases, content-based restrictions must survive 
rational basis review and be reasonable. See Ysursa, 555 U.S. at 359–60; Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 808–09 
(rejecting a heightened reasonableness inquiry for a nonpublic forum and stating that “[t]he 
Government’s decision to restrict access to a nonpublic forum need only be reasonable; it need not be 
the most reasonable or the only reasonable limitation”). The Court has not expressly held that the 
reasonableness standard is identical in both contexts. See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 893 n.12 (Souter, J., 
dissenting). But neither has it indicated it is not identical in both contexts. 
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are discernible from the Court’s subsidized speech cases, which fall into four 
discrete categories. 
First, the Court has applied the subsidized speech doctrine to uphold laws 
involving government speech. In Rust, the Court analyzed a federal grant as a 
subsidy involving the government’s own speech and upheld the grant’s restrictions 
on abortion services and counseling.340 Second, the Court has applied the 
subsidized speech doctrine to uphold tax subsidies. In Cammarano and again in 
Regan, the Court analyzed tax subsidies as instances of subsidized speech and 
upheld laws restricting the availability of the subsidy for political speech.341 A third 
area in which the Court has applied the doctrine is to uphold programs allocating 
competitive funding in which content-based decisions are unavoidable.342 In 
National Endowment for the Arts, the Court upheld federal restrictions on a 
competitive grant program providing funding to artists that involved decisions 
based on subject matter but not on viewpoint.343 
The fourth application of the doctrine is to analyze as subsidized speech the 
content-based provision of subsidies to the press, but unlike in the other subsidy 
cases, the Court has not permitted content-based restrictions.344 In Hannegan v. 
Esquire, the Court engaged in constitutional avoidance and construed a statute as 
denying the United States Postmaster General the authority to revoke a 
magazine’s second-class postage permit, which subsidizes postage rates for certain 
classes of publications, on the basis of the magazine’s content.345 In Arkansas 
Writers’ Project, Inc. v. Ragland, the Court reached the constitutional issue it had 
avoided in Hannegan and held that the government cannot provide subsidies that 
discriminate among different publications.346 The case concerned a challenge to an 
Arkansas law that provided a tax subsidy to magazines on the basis of their subject 
matter, so that religious, profession, trade, and sports magazines received the 
subsidy while general interest magazines did not.347 Significantly, the Court applied 
strict scrutiny even though it concluded the subsidy discriminated only on the 
basis of subject matter and not viewpoint.348 
 
340. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 188 (1991). 
341. Regan v. Taxation with Representation, 461 U.S. 540, 546 (1983) (reaching the same 
conclusion as the court did in Cammarano). 
342. Nat’l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 584–85 (1998); CHEMERINSKY, 
supra note 32 at 968. 
343. Nat’l Endowment for the Arts, 524 U.S. at 585–88. 
344. Cole, supra note 319, at 731–32. 
345. Hannegan v. Esquire, Inc., 327 U.S. 146, 151, 156 (1946). 
346. Ark. Writers’ Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221 (1987). 
347. Id. at 223, 229–30. 
348. Id. at 230–31, 234. The Court applied similar reasoning to strike down the rescission of a 
press subsidy through the imposition of a tax that had the effect of singling out specific newspapers. 
Minneapolis Star & Tribute Co. v. Minn. Comm’r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 585, 591 (1983) 
(applying strict scrutiny and declaring unconstitutional a Minnesota tax on ink and paper in 
publications in which the first $100,000 of ink and paper used were exempted). However, the Court 
upheld a tax that distinguishes not among individual publications, but rather among different 
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In contrast, the Court treated subsidies as fora in several other cases. 
Specifically, the Court analyzed a subsidy as a forum in three cases concerning the 
funding of student organizations at public universities. In Christian Legal Society, the 
Court analyzed a public law school’s provision of school funds and facilities to 
registered student organizations as a forum.349 Similarly, in Rosenberger v. Rector, the 
Court treated a student activity fund (SAF) as a forum, and held that the state 
university violated the First Amendment when it refused to provide SAF funding 
to a Christian student group that published a religious magazine.350 And in 
University of Wisconsin v. Southworth, the Court considered the “antecedent” question 
left unresolved in Rosenberger, which was whether a public university’s imposition 
of a mandatory student fee to fund its student activities fund violates the First 
Amendment.351 The Court analogized to its public forum cases and implicitly 
invoked the limited public forum doctrine by holding that viewpoint neutrality 
was the controlling standard.352 
A fourth forum case is Cornelius v. NAACP, in which the Court analyzed the 
Combined Federal Campaign (CFC) as a forum.353 The CFC is a workplace charity 
for federal employees in which employees have the option of using payroll 
deductions to donate to participating organizations.354 The Court rejected a First 
Amendment challenge by organizations excluded from the CFC, and held the 
CFC was a nonpublic forum in which reasonable subject-matter and speaker-
based distinctions were permissible.355 
A fifth case, Velazquez , is more difficult to categorize. On the one hand, the 
Court stated that the Legal Services Corporation (LSC) funding was a subsidy and 
not a forum.356 On the other hand, the Court cited to its forum cases as authority 
for its reasoning that the restriction violated the First Amendment. The Court 
held the restriction unconstitutional because it “distorts the legal system by 
altering the traditional role of the attorneys in much the same way” as the ordinary 
functioning of the forums was disrupted by conditions the Court had previously 
held were unconstitutional.357 
Although there may be no unifying theory underlying all of the Court’s 
subsidy cases, they nevertheless fall into discrete categories in which the Court has 
determined that content-based decisions are either necessary or desirable. First, 
the Court has placed government speech outside the First Amendment entirely 
 
branches of the media. Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439 (1991) (upholding a gross receipts tax that 
exempted newspapers and magazine but not cable television). 
349. Christian Legal Soc’y Chapter of Univ. of Cal., Hastings Coll. of Law v. Martinez, 561 
U.S. 661, 669 (2010). 
350. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 844–45 (1995). 
351. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 233 (2000). 
352. Id. at 229–30. 
353. See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, at 801–04 (1985). 
354. Id. at 791. 
355. Id. 
356. Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 544–49 (2001). 
357. Id. at 543–44. 
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per its recognition that the political branches could not function if they were 
unable to express any viewpoint without meeting strict scrutiny.358 Similar 
justifications undergird a second category of cases involving tax subsidies, which 
implicate one of Congress’s broadest powers359 and an area of plenary authority 
for the states.360 Even this power, however, is cabined in several respects. Tax 
subsidies that restrict speech beyond the scope of the subsidy violate the 
unconstitutional conditions doctrine.361 In addition, content-based tax subsidies 
directed at the press trigger strict scrutiny,362 which is required by the critical role 
the press plays in a free society.363 Third, treating merit-based competitive grant 
programs as subsidized speech is necessary because such programs cannot be 
disbursed without reference to the content of the applications.364 Thus, 
application of the subsidized speech doctrine to each of these areas may be 
necessary to provide the government the ability to govern and to administer 
socially beneficial programs such as funding for the arts. Extending the subsidized 
speech doctrine beyond these narrow categories is undesirable, however, because 
this would erode constitutional rights with no obvious justification. 
Payroll-restriction laws fit none of the precedents for the subsidized speech 
doctrine. Payroll-restriction laws obviously do not involve government speech: 
unlike the Title X program in Rust, they include no programmatic or substantive 
elements and do not require any speech. Instead, they are more similar to the LSC 
funding in Velazquez , the SAF funding in Rosenberger and Southworth, and the 
federal workplace charity drive in Cornelius because they are simply vehicles to 
facilitate private speech via automatic deductions to various recipients. Nor do 
they implicate the government’s taxation power. And unlike the grant program in 
Finley, which required the allocation of a finite amount of grant money to a large 
pool of potential recipients, making payroll deductions available to employees is 
not a zero sum game. Stated differently, modern technology does not limit the 
capacity of electronic payroll systems to accommodate deductions for additional 
recipients, and adding one deduction does not require eliminating another. 
Because it is possible to accommodate any number of payroll deductions, payroll 
administrators need not pick and choose which deductions to offer, and content-
based exclusions are therefore unnecessary. Content-based exclusions are also 
undesirable because they conflict with the Court’s general political speech 
 
358. Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 553 (2005). 
359. See Regan v. Taxation with Representation, 461 U.S. 540, 547–48 (1983); see also United 
States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, at 65–69. (1936). 
360. Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83, 93 (1940). 
361. Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958). 
362. Ark. Writers Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 228 (1987). 
363. See Cole, supra note 319 (arguing for a “spheres of neutrality” approach to the First 
Amendment requiring that public institutions such as the press and public universities that are central 
to free expression operate with some independence from government control). 
364. Nat’l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 587–89 (1998). 
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jurisprudence prohibiting limitations on political speech and in particular the 
Court’s strong rejection in Citizens United of speaker-based regulations. 
In conclusion, payroll-restriction laws appear to violate two fundamental 
tenets of the First Amendment because they limit political speech and furthermore 
discriminate based upon the content of speech. Although payroll-restriction laws 
do not prohibit speech directly, and instead simply condition the availability of a 
government benefit (the payroll system),365 such indirect regulation of speech 
nevertheless triggers heightened First Amendment protection if the regulation 
constitutes an unconstitutional condition that makes a benefit unavailable to 
people who refuse to relinquish their constitutional rights.366 However, the Court 
has held that government may decline to subsidize speech, and the Court cognizes 
restrictions on government benefits as lawful instances of subsidized speech, and 
not unconstitutional conditions, when the conditions are limited to the scope of 
the activities subsidized by the benefit.367 Nevertheless, the Court has also held 
that government subsidies may constitute forums in which the government’s 
ability to enforce content-based regulations may be more limited, depending upon 
how a court categorizes the particular forum.368 Although the Court has never 
clarified when it will apply forum analysis and when it will analyze conditions on 
benefits as subsidized speech, the Court’s subsidized speech cases are inapposite 
to payroll-restriction laws.369 This final point is especially significant because 
Ysursa’s extension of the subsidized speech doctrine to encompass payroll-
restriction laws has implications that reach beyond the payroll deductions context 
in ways that are deeply troubling. 
III. IMPLICATIONS OF YSURSA 
There are two important implications of Ysursa, each of which muddy 
existing doctrine and have the undesirable effect of eroding First Amendment 
protections without any countervailing benefit. First, the case breaks new ground 
for the subsidized speech doctrine by extending the doctrine to a novel context 
not cabined by any obvious limiting principle. Second, Ysursa collapses any 
distinction between the subsidized speech and forum doctrines and provides no 
guidance as to when, if ever, courts should treat a nonphysical subsidy as a forum 
rather than as an instance of subsidized speech. 
 
365. See Ysursa v. Pocatello Educ. Ass’n, 555 U.S. 353, 367–68 (2009) (differentiating direct 
prohibitions of speech and indirect benefit conditioning). 
366. See id. at 581–82 (conditioning granting of benefits on type of artistic expression). 
367. See id. at 585–86 (emphasizing the scope of the subsidy). 
368. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 837 (1995). 
369. See Nat’l Endowment for the Arts, 524 U.S. at 588 (defining subsidized speech as the 
government choosing to promote certain speech); see also Ysursa, 555 U.S. at 355 (defining payroll 
restriction cases as the government’s refusal to promote certain speech). 
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A. Expanding the Subsidized Speech Doctrine 
Ysursa stands apart from the Court’s other subsidized speech cases in two 
important respects. First, never before had the Court applied the doctrine to a 
subsidy this small. Although the district court in Ysursa made no findings 
regarding the actual cost to the state of including political contributions among the 
many other possible deductions available to its employees, common sense and 
evidence from other states suggest the cost is miniscule and possibly too small to 
measure. In addition, many states have laws allowing the government to recoup 
from their employees’ unions any costs actually incurred from providing the 
payroll deductions.370 In fact, independent analyses suggest payroll-restriction laws 
may actually increase government’s costs due to new enforcement requirements.371 
There are three possible readings of this aspect of Ysursa’s treatment of 
subsidies. The first is that Ysursa stands for the proposition that any amount of 
subsidy is sufficient to trigger the subsidized speech doctrine, even if the subsidy 
actually saves the state money.372 This reading would create a gaping exception to 
the First Amendment in light of the government’s pervasive activities and wide-
ranging administrative functions. A second reading of Ysursa, already adopted by 
one lower court, is that the case simply stands for the narrower proposition that 
“the use of a state payroll system to collect union dues from public sector 
employees is a state subsidy of speech.”373 Under this reading, Ysursa creates a per 
se rule that state payroll systems are subsidies irrespective of how much they cost 
the state to provide or whether they actually cost the state any money at all. 
Although this reading appears to apply only to government payroll systems, such a 
limitation appears to rest on arbitrary line drawing. This rule contains no obvious 
limiting principle as to why courts would not extend Ysursa to other settings 
involving negligible government spending and analyze them, as under the first 
reading, as instances of subsidized speech allowing content-based regulation. 
However, a third possible reading of Ysursa is that the Court merely assumed 
the Idaho payroll systems were a subsidy because it was presented with no 
evidence to the contrary, and lower courts may therefore distinguish Ysursa by 
making findings of fact that the particular payroll systems in question are not 
subsidies. In the absence of such factual findings, lower courts might distinguish 
Ysursa by finding a de mininis exception to the subsidy doctrine that includes the 
incremental cost of adding a new deduction to a pre-established payroll system. 
Although the Supreme Court has offered no guidance on how much a state must 
spend on a payroll system to trigger the subsidized speech doctrine, the Court has 
nevertheless severely limited what constitutes government expenditures in other 
 
370. See supra notes 80–81. 
371. See supra note 82. 
372. See Proposition 32: Analysis, supra note 60. 
373. Wis. Educ. Ass’n Council v. Walker, 705 F.3d 640, 652 (7th Cir. 2013). 
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First Amendment contexts in order to limit the exceptions such spending 
creates.374 
The second way in which Ysursa stands alone as a subsidized speech case is 
that, unlike any of the Court’s other subsidized speech cases, the plaintiffs in 
Ysursa did not want the subsidy.375 In Cammarano, Regan, Rust, and Finley, the 
plaintiffs challenging the laws actively pursued the government subsidy.376 In 
contrast, in Ysursa the unions sought access to the payroll system but took pains to 
avoid accepting any subsidy and even offered to reimburse the government for the 
cost of their payroll deductions.377 The significance of this distinction is whether 
the government may use subsidies not only as a shield permitting it to make 
subject-matter and speaker-based choices necessary to implement its programs, 
and even viewpoint-based choices in the context of government speech, but also 
as a sword to disable the First Amendment protections of private speakers who do 
not want the subsidy and thus restrict speech in ways the First Amendment would 
never allow. 
B. Collapsing the Distinction Between Subsidized Speech and Forums 
The second troubling implication of Ysursa is that it appears to collapse any 
distinction between when courts should analyze government spending under the 
subsidized speech doctrine versus the forum doctrine. As discussed, state payroll 
systems do not fit into any of the categories in which the Court has found 
permissible subsidies.378 Payroll systems are not government speech because, 
unlike the Title X program in Rust, they contain no programmatic content aimed 
at dealing with a particular problem in a particular way.379 They are simply a 
vehicle for the speech of private speakers and contain no independent 
government message. Nor do payroll deductions implicate the government’s 
 
374. See, e.g., Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 131 S. Ct. 1436 (2010) (holding tax 
credits are not a government expenditure pursuant to a statute for the purpose of creating taxpayer 
standing to raise establishment clause challengers under Flast v. Cohen); Hein v. Freedom from 
Religion Found., Inc., 551 U.S. 587 (2007) (executive expenditures); Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. 
Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464 (1982) (giving of government 
property). 
375. Ysursa v. Pocatello Educ. Ass’n, 555 U.S. 353, 357 (2009). 
376. See, e.g., Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 199 n.5 (1991) (“The recipient is in no way 
compelled to operate a Title X project; to avoid the force of the regulations, it can simply decline the 
subsidy. . . . By accepting Title X funds, a recipient voluntarily consents to any restrictions placed on 
any matching funds or grant-related income. Potential grant recipients can choose between accepting 
Title X funds—subject to the Government’s conditions that they provide matching funds and forgo 
abortion counseling and referral in the Title X project—or declining the subsidy and financing their 
own unsubsidized program. We have never held that the Government violates the First Amendment 
simply by offering that choice.”). 
377. Pocatello Educ. Ass’n v. Heideman, No. CV-03-0256-E-BLW, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
34494, at *8–9 (D. Idaho Nov. 23, 2005), rev’d on other grounds, 561 F.3d 1048 (9th Cir. 2009) (reversing 
in accordance with Ysursa, 555 U.S. at 358). 
378. Id. 
379. Rust, 500 U.S. at 184–87 (specifying what the family planning regulations cover). 
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taxing powers or any other power of comparable reach. And unlike the grant 
program for the arts in Finely, payroll systems do not involve a scarce resource 
allocated through a competitive process requiring the government to make choices 
based upon content.380 
Instead, cases involving state payroll systems should be controlled on their 
facts by Cornelius, in which the Court applied forum analysis to a payroll deduction 
program.381 Payroll deductions also share similarities to the student activity funds 
the Court analyzed as forums in Rosenberger and Southworth, because their primary 
purpose is to facilitate and expand private speech.382 But by treating Idaho’s 
payroll system—a context in which content-based restrictions are neither 
necessary nor desirable—as subsidized speech, the Ysursa Court leaves no clear 
direction for lower courts to treat any nonphysical subsidy as a forum. 
The implications of this development are troubling in an age when 
nonphysical forums are acquiring increasing significance due to evolving 
technologies and shifting modes of communication. If the government funds an 
Internet forum or chat room open to everyone, is it free to exclude particular 
speakers and topics? What if the government provides an indirect and de minimis 
subsidy for a privately operated Internet forum, perhaps because a subsidized 
public utility provides the electricity or fiber optic cables? Under forum analysis, 
the government would have no de facto right to restrict speech in these situations 
and any content-based restrictions would require a showing that the forum had 
not been intentionally opened up for free expression such that it had become a 
designated public forum. Under the subsidized speech doctrine, however, no such 
analysis is required and content-based restrictions are permissible so long as they 
are reasonable. 
IV. WHY PAYROLL DEDUCTION LAWS VIOLATE THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
While deeply problematic, Ysursa nevertheless leaves open several options 
for lower courts to strike down laws restricting payroll deductions. Such laws may 
be challenged as viewpoint discrimination; they may be distinguished from Ysursa 
through factual findings that the payroll system is not a subsidy; and they may be 
analyzed as designated public forums in which content-based restrictions targeting 
political speech or union speakers are impermissible. 
 
380. Even if a public employer utilized a technologically archaic payroll system that was 
limited with regard to the number of deduction recipients it could accommodate, the First 
Amendment would still require it to allocate those spaces in a neutral and nondiscriminatory fashion. 
See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 835 (1995). 
381. Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 801 (1985). 
382. See Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 233–34 (2000) 
(finding the student’s speech was extracurricular); Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 834 (categorizing student 
speech as private because the student groups eligible for the University’s funding are not university 
agents). 
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A. Viewpoint Discrimination 
Unions may successfully challenge any payroll restriction if they can prove it 
discriminates according to viewpoint. This argument will prevail regardless of the 
analysis a court applies because viewpoint discrimination is impermissible whether 
a court applies the subsidized speech doctrine383 or forum analysis.384 As 
discussed, the one context in which viewpoint-based restrictions are permissible is 
inapposite because government-operated payroll systems are not government 
speech.385 Several iterations of payroll-restriction laws may thus be challenged as 
discriminating based upon viewpoint. 
First, laws that apply only to unions may be challenged as viewpoint 
discrimination. Significantly, the Ysursa plaintiffs acknowledged before the Ninth 
Circuit that they had not attempted to establish viewpoint discrimination and the 
issue was not presented to the Supreme Court.386 Thus, Ysursa is not controlling 
authority for the proposition that a payroll-restriction law that singles out unions 
does not discriminate according to viewpoint. 
This is significant because many payroll-restriction laws are not truly facially 
neutral, but specifically exempt contributions to employee benefit plans and 
charities,387 and these organizations often use funds obtained through payroll 
deductions for political purposes.388 Many insurance companies exempted from 
payroll-restriction laws spend considerable sums on lobbying and campaign 
contributions.389 Even nonprofits designated as 501(c)(3)s under the tax code are 
permitted to spend funds on politics so long as this does not comprise a 
“substantial part” of their overall activities.390 And charities making a 501(h) 
election may spend up to $1 million on lobbying, a sum that does not even include 
political expenditures falling outside the IRS’s definition of “lobbying.”391 
As discussed, the Court’s precedents provide authority for considering the 
purpose and effect of laws to prove they are content based, although the cases are 
not entirely consistent on this point. One method of determining viewpoint 
discrimination is whether the justifications that a state claims for its law are 
underinclusive.392 This line of analysis would appear to invalidate the most 
 
383. See, e.g., Regan v. Taxation with Representation, 461 U.S. 540, 548 (1983). 
384. Christian Legal Soc’y Chapter of Univ. of Cal., Hastings Coll. of Law v. Martinez, 561 
U.S. 661, 679 (2010). 
385. Id. 
386. Ysursa v. Pocatello Educ. Ass’n, 555 U.S. 353, 361 n.3 (2009). 
387. E.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-361.02(E) (2012), invalidated by United Food & 
Commercial Workers Local 99 v. Brewer, 817 F. Supp. 2d 1118 (D. Ariz. 2011); Cal. Proposition 32 
sec 2. § 85150(c) (2012). 
388. § 23–361.02(E); § 85150(c) (2012). 
389. LAFER, supra note 75, at 8–9. 
390. 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) (2012); United Food & Commercial Workers, 817 F. Supp. 2d at 1118 
n.1 (citing cases holding that less than 5% of an organization’s activity is not substantial, while over 
16.6% is substantial). 
391. 26 U.S.C. § 501(h); id. § 4911. 
392. Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2740 (2011). 
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common justifications for such laws. For example, a state’s claim that its law is 
aimed at “avoiding the appearance that carrying out the public’s business is tainted 
by partisan political activity”393 appears substantially underinclusive if the law 
permits organizations other than unions to make political contributions using 
money received through payroll deductions. The justification that the law would 
save the state money394 is even more underinclusive in light of the negligible 
incremental costs associated with specific payroll deductions and the myriad other 
line items consuming far greater shares of state budgets. 
Second, several states, notably Wisconsin and Michigan, have passed laws 
targeting only particular unions.395 In fact, both laws targeted only unions that had 
recently waged high-profile campaigns opposing Republican officials campaigning 
for statewide office.396 These laws are readily distinguishable from the Idaho law 
upheld in Ysursa because it applied equally to all unions.397 
B. Payroll Deductions Are Not a Subsidy 
District courts may also distinguish Ysursa by making findings of fact that the 
payroll system in question is not a government subsidy. As discussed, the record 
in Ysursa was devoid of any evidence of the state’s actual cost of providing the 
prohibited political deductions and thus there was no evidence that the payroll 
system actually constituted a public subsidy of employee political activity.398 In 
addition, as noted, many states have laws allowing them to recover from unions 
any costs of providing them payroll deductions.399 Even if evidence is presented 
that the addition of deductions to a preexisting payroll system does impose an 
incremental cost upon the government, a court could nevertheless find a de 
minimis exception to the subsidized speech doctrine for very small subsidies. 
C. Payroll Systems Are Designated Public Forums 
A third way lower courts can preserve First Amendment protections for 
union members targeted by payroll-restriction laws is to apply forum analysis to 
 
393. Ysursa v. Pocatello Educ. Ass’n, 555 U.S. 353, 355 (2009). 
394. Bailey v. Callaghan, 715 F.3d 956, 967 (6th Cir. 2013). 
395. Id. at 957–58 (upholding a law eliminating dues deduction for public school employees); 
Wis. Educ. Ass’n Council v. Walker, 705 F.3d 640 (7th Cir. 2013) (upholding a law eliminating dues 
deduction for only certain public employees). Although both cases concerned laws banning the use of 
payroll deductions for all union dues, and not merely payments used for political purposes, both 
courts applied Ysursa and found it controlling. 
396. See Bailey, 715 F.3d at 966–67; Wis. Educ. Ass’n Council, 705 F.3d at 664–65. 
397. Ysursa, 555 U.S. at 361 n.3 (noting the law applies to all organizations and stating that 
“[i]f the ban is not enforced evenhandedly, plaintiffs are free to bring an as applied challenge”). But see 
Bailey, 715 F.3d at 968; Wis. Educ. Ass’n Council, 705 F.3d at 642 (each holding laws singling out only 
certain unions do not discriminate based upon viewpoint). 
398. Pocatello Educ. Ass’n v. Heideman, No. CV-03-0256-E-BLW, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
34494, at *16 (D. Idaho Nov. 23, 2005), rev’d on other grounds, 561 F.3d 1048 (9th Cir. 2009) (reversing 
in accordance with Ysursa, 555 U.S. at 358). 
399. See supra notes 80–81. 
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the payroll systems. As discussed, the Court’s subsidized speech and forum cases 
strongly indicate that this is the approach most consistent with the Court’s 
precedents.400 
Once a court determines a payroll system is a forum, it must then determine 
what type of forum. The Supreme Court has never articulated clear criteria for 
determining which type of forum applies to a particular place.401 Nevertheless, its 
cases implicitly suggest criteria including, first, the tradition of the availability of 
the forum for speech; second, whether the speech is incompatible with the 
forum;402 and, most important, third, whether the government places limits on the 
speakers that may use the forum for speech or the subjects they may discuss.403 
First, many government payroll systems are made available for a wide range 
of mandatory and voluntary uses, ranging from income taxes, to health and 
welfare plans, to charities, to union dues.404 For example, a 2011 report provided 
by the Florida Chief Financial Officer’s office identified 364 groups and agencies 
approved to receive payments via payroll deductions.405 In Missouri, the approved 
list exceeds 450 recipients.406 
Second, payroll systems are compatible with speech. The Court has held that 
institutional settings such as prisons407 and military bases408 are incompatible with 
speech. In contrast, the use of payroll systems to make automatic deductions does 
not implicate public safety concerns or undermine the nation’s military readiness. 
Third, many states impose very minimal front end limitations on the uses to 
which their payroll systems may be put, requiring only that the employer and 
employee agree to the deduction, that the employee authorize the deduction, and 
 
400. See supra Part II.B.3.d. The Sixth Circuit rejected the use of forum analysis for a 
government payroll system, reasoning that forums are limited to “places where ‘some form of 
communicative activity occurs,’” while “the ministerial act of deducting a particular sum from an 
employee’s paycheck” is not expressive activity. Bailey, 715 F.3d at 958–59 (citation omitted). 
However, the Sixth Circuit majority opinion failed to acknowledge either Martinez or Rosenburger, each 
of which analyzed a nonphysical subsidy (funding for student organizations) as a forum. Even more 
troubling, it also ignored the Court’s political speech cases that hold that spending money on politics 
is protected speech. See, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 323 (2009); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 
U.S. 1, 14–15 (1976) (per curiam). 
401. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 32, at 1186. 
402. See id. 
403. Christian Legal Soc’y Chapter of Univ. of Cal., Hastings Coll. of Law v. Martinez, 561 
U.S. 661, 679 n.11 (2010). This reasoning is somewhat circular. If the government places front end 
restrictions on the speakers or subjects that may access a forum, courts may label it a limited public 
forum and those restrictions will be upheld, provided they are viewpoint-neutral and reasonable. But 
if the government makes a forum widely available, and then imposes identical restrictions later on, 
courts may label the forum a designated public forum and invalidate those restrictions under strict 
scrutiny. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 32, at 1177–78. 
404. See infra notes 405–406. 
405. Data available at supra note 34; see also Sharockman, supra note 33 (citing the data). 
406. LAFER, supra note 75, at 8. 
407. Adderly v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 47–48 (1966). 
408. Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 839–44 (1976). 
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that the deduction not violate any law.409 For example, in California public 
employees may make contributions using payroll deductions to, inter alia, unions, 
charities, credit unions, state government programs, employee benefit programs, 
and any “bona fide association,” which needs only register with the state and have 
at least fifty employees making contributions via payroll deductions.410 
Ultimately, forum analysis is highly fact specific and will turn on the 
particular use and history of a state’s payroll system. Nevertheless, these criteria 
may provide a starting point for a court to conclude that a public payroll system is 
a designated public forum and that strict scrutiny accordingly applies. 
CONCLUSION 
Although access to payroll deductions for government employees may 
appear to be an unlikely political battleground, efforts to restrict their use to 
achieve partisan ends date back to the early 1990s and continue to this day. This is 
because the use of mechanisms such as automated deductions and opt-out 
systems have enormously powerful effects on behavior with regard to union 
political contributions, just as they do for a wide range of other applications. 
While policymakers are beginning to recognize the potential these mechanisms 
hold for shaping public policy in socially desirable ways, the political opponents of 
unions and the candidates they support have already harnessed these insights to 
limit union political fundraising. Moreover, because the stakes of passing payroll-
restriction laws are so high, unions’ opponents can divert significant union 
resources by simply qualifying such measures for the state ballot, even if they 
never succeed in passing them. 
Although the Court in Ysursa recently upheld Idaho’s payroll-restriction 
law,411 it is difficult to reconcile Ysursa with many of the Court’s First Amendment 
precedents. The case is perhaps in greatest dissonance with Citizens United because 
it appears to greenlight efforts by Republican-controlled legislatures to pass 
partisan legislation aimed at silencing one voice in the political conversation. 
Moreover, Ysursa raises but does not answer serious questions about the extent to 
which the First Amendment will continue to protect against government efforts to 
single out certain forms of speech through the conditional provision of benefits. 
Ultimately, the Court should overrule Ysursa for these reasons. Nevertheless, until 
it does, lower courts retain several doctrinal tools that may allow them to strike 
down other paycheck restriction laws. 
  
 
409. See generally Wage Deduction Laws, SOC’Y FOR HUM. RESOURCE MGMT., 
https://www.shrm.org/legalissues/stateandlocalresources/stateandlocalstatutesandregulations 
/documents/deductionlaw.pdf (revised Oct. 2013) (listing state wage deduction laws). 
410. CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 1150(c)–(d), 1151, 1152 (West 2010 & Supp. 2014); STATE OF 
CAL., DEDUCTION PROGRAM HANDBOOK 10, 14 (n.d.), available at http://www.sco.ca.gov/Files 
-PPSD/dedinfo_particip_misc-ftp.pdf. 
411. Ysursa v. Pocatello Educ. Ass’n, 555 U.S. 353, 364 (2009). 
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